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May 2002Executive  Summary
This  survey  is  no  more  than  an  introduction  to  child  labor  issues,  a  fast  expanding
research  and  policy  area.  It  deals  with the  many  aspects  of child  labor,  including  its
causes and effects as well as policies associated  with it.
Child labor is as old as humanity - no age group was spared from the harsh survival effort
in  primitive  societies.  And  child  labor  was  not  always  necessary  "bad"  in  the
environment  it operated.  But as  development  accelerated  and,  in fact,  the  incidence  of
child labor declined,  child labor has come to be considered  increasingly  an expression of
poverty,  both  a  cause  and  an  effect  of  underdevelopment.  The  debate  on  and
commitment to reduce and eliminate child labor gathered  speed in the  second half of the
20'h  century  especially  at  the  international  level  with the  landmark  Convention  on  the
Rights of the Child (1989),  the universal  ratification of the  ILO's Convention  ...  on the
Elimination of All  Forms of Harmful  Child Labor  (1998) and the  universal  adoption of
the Millennium  Development Goals (2000) of which  many relate to children's  education
and  health.  If the  admittedly  partial  bibliography  of our  survey  is  anywhere  closer to
reality, it shows that almost 80 percent of publications relating  to child labor came in the
1990s of which a full one-quarter appeared  in the third millennium.
The survey takes the reader from  the definition  and measurement  of "child"  and
"labor"  (our  first  chapter)  to  what we  call  the  "pathology"  of child  labor,  the  extreme
forms of child exploitation,  the use of children  in activities that are morally repugnant or
dangerous  to  the  child's health  and  even  life.  Between  these two  extremes,  from  the
methodological aspects to the vulgar realities, we examine
*  Why do children work?
*  How failures  in the capital markets affect child labor?
*  What is the role of household  income?
*  How does child labor interplay with education?
*  What is the effect of household  structure on child labor?
*  How does parental  education affect child labor?
*  What does the presence  or absence of social security  affect child labor?*  What other policies affect child labor
*  How is the market for child labor determined?
Some topics receive a short treatment often reflecting the paucity of analysis or evidence
given the "infant industry" nature of this part of economics.  Others are covered in greater
length  only to produce  ambiguous  theoretical  predictions  and prima  facie  contradictory
evidence.
Clearly this is work in progress.  This is why we gave the sub-title "Version 2002" to this
survey.  Our hope is that the literature on this important topic will continue to mushroom,
and  increasing  awareness  and  better  design  and  execution  of projects,  programs  and
policies will contribute to the elimination  of child  labor.  This has happened already.  For
example, there are practically no working children  in Europe today though in the not too
distant  past the  employment  rates of children  were as high there as they are in many of
the developing countries today.  The share of children who were working  in Italy  in 1950
was above the world average.  In  1995  the world average  stood at  13  percent but in Italy
the figure was less than half of one percent.  Child labor is an endangered species but, as
long as it exists,  it can endanger many children.
We very much hope not provide  a more comprehensive,  more  in  depth treatment of the
subject in the future.  More importantly,  we hope to be able to be  in a position to provide
a  more  adequate  menu  of policy  options  than  those  covered  in  this  volume.  The
complexity  of the  issue  and  the  sporadic  evaluations  undertaken  so  far  allow- only  for
limited generalizations.  Hopefully,  by the time these generalizations become  valid,  child
labor  will  no longer  exist.  Child  labor  should  not be  a  development  policy  issue  but
should become the subject of economic history.
Policies  Discouraging  Child Labor
The analytics and arguments of many aspects of child labor are explain in some length in
the  main  survey.  No  need  to  summarize  here  the  many  nuances  of  theoretical
approaches  studies  or qualifications  of empirical  evaluations.  But it might be useful to
iiprovide  the  reader  with  a  summary  view  of various  policies  and their  established  or
suspected effects.
Two  caveats  are  in  order.  First,  child  labor  cannot  be  viewed  in  isolation  from
educational,  health,  fertility,  and  technological  issues.  Second,  leaving  aside  extreme
forms  of  exploitation,  child  labor  is  not  necessarily  an  aberration  but  a  rational
household response to an adverse economic environment.
With this in mind, the following proposition receives consistent empirical support:
Forbidding  children  to  work  or  making  school  attendance  compulsory  without
changing the economic environment may,  if effectively  enforced,  leave  children
worse off.
If so,  one  can  identify  (indirect)  policy  measures  which  can  change  the  economic
environment  in the desired direction  and (direct) policy measures  that remove  children
from the labor market.  Taken together,  these measures  have the potential  reduce child
labor without compulsion or prohibition.
Indirect measures
*  Providing  schools  close to communities  reduces the  incidence  of child  labor
and increases household  expenditure  on the education of their children.  It also
reduces fertility and improves  child nutrition.
*  Universal  income  subsidies  to  parents  are  an  expensive  way  of discouraging
child labor  because  some of the  subsidy will end up as adult consumption,  and
are counter-effective  in families where children would otherwise  study full time.
Income  subsidies  targeted  at  poorer  families,  whose  children  are  unlikely  to
attend  school  in the absence  of policy  interventions,  are  more  cost-effective.
Therefore,  income  redistribution  could  help  to  reduce  child  labor,  encourage
school attendance, and improve the nutritional status of children.*  Land redistribution  could increase the incidence of child labor because  it would
increase  the productivity of labor in households that receive additional  land and
reduce  it  in  those  from  which  land  is  taken  away.  This  would  increase  the
probability  of work for children  in lower-income  households  and reduce  it for
children  in higher-income  households where  parents  are unlikely to make their
children work anyway.
* Policies  that increase  a child's  chances  of surviving  into  adulthood  reduce  the
probability  that a  school-age  child will  work and  increase  the probability  that
the child  will  go  to  school.  These  policies  also  increase  the  consumption  of
school-age  children  and  the  amount spent by  households  on the  education of
each child who attends school.
*  Increasing  the  education  of women  has positive  but  uneven  effects  on  school
attendance and child labor.
* The  extension  of old-age  security  and  credit  availability  to  poor  parts  of the
community,  primarily  the  rural  poor,  which  is where  most  child  labor comes
from, reduces fertility and child labor  and increases  school attendance.
* Economic  growth  helps  to  reduce  child  labor,  but  policies  fostering  economic
growth cannot be relied upon to reduce child labor in the short run.
Therefore,  several of the policies that help to reduce child labor in the short run also have
a  beneficial  long-term  effect  via higher  growth.  How  large  is the  second  effect?  The
evidence  is not very  clear cut but from  some country  specific results we tend to believe
that income redistribution  from the rich to the poor is more powerful  for reducing child
labor than a universal  income rise. This is so because the income elasticity of child labor
decreases  as  income  increases.  This  suggests  that  growth  without  re-distribution  may
take too long to have a noticeable effect  on child  labor. Having  said this, there are  some
spectacular cases  of child  labor decrease  (for example,  in Thailand  in the  1980s and Viet
Nam  in the 1990s)  as well as  some promising ones where the Government  is placing  its
weight behind the issue (such as In Brazil).
ivDirect  measures
In addition  to the general, rather indirect,  policies discussed  above, we selectively survey
more  direct  ways  of  reducing  child  labor,  for  example,  offering  households  direct
payments  conditional  on the  child not working and/or  attending  school.  Even  if school
attendance  is  a  condition  for  obtaining  the  payment,  such  payments  differ  from
conventional  scholarships  in that their primary  purpose  is to discourage  child  labor and
only secondarily to allow talented children or young people of modest means to obtain an
education.  While  a  scholarship  is  usually  conditional  on  a  high  level  of scholastic  or
academic  performance,  such conditionality  is either absent or set at a very  basic  level  in
schemes that have the child's withdrawal  from the labor force  as their primary objective.
What these  schemes  do,  essentially,  is  "buy"  a  child's  time.  By way  of example,  we
briefly  describe  three  projects  carried  out  respectively  in  Morocco  (the BAJ program),
Bangladesh  (the  FFE - Food-for-Education  - program)  and  Mexico  (the  Progresa
program).
The  BAJ aims  to  increase  access  of the  rural  poor  to  basic  social  services,  such  as
preventive  and  curative health  care,  maternal  and neonatal  care, and primary education.
The BAJ has three  features that distinguish  it from similar social investment  initiatives:  it
is  targeted  to  the  provinces  that  rank  lowest  in  terms  of poverty,  has  a  multi-sector
approach  designed  to exploit potential  synergies,  and decentralizes  service delivery  and
decision  making,  holding  provincial  authorities  responsible  for  the  planning,
implementation, and monitoring of the program.
The  FFE promotes  school  attendance  by  "buying"  children's  time.  Households
participating  in  the  program  receive  monthly  food  rations  so  long  as  they  send  their
children  to  school.  Potential  participants  are  selected  in  two  stages.  First,  central
authorities  choose  areas  on the basis of their  degree of underdevelopment  and,  then, the
local communities are then  left to decide which of the households  in their locality should
participate  in the program.The Progressa  subsidises  education,  health  care,  and nutrition  in poor rural  households
and  aims to  reduce  poverty  and  increase  investment  in  human  capital,  thus  breaking
intergenerational  poverty.  It  provides  grants  to  poor  families  for  children  enrolled  in
school  between the third grade of primary and the third grade of secondary school who do
not miss more than a threshold  number of school days in a single month.
With  respect  to the  BAJ,  the provinces  that  are  covered  by the  program  do  not  show
significant  overall  gains  in  access to  health  facilities  (as  measured  by  clinic  visits  and
medicine  acquisition)  or  in  school  enrollment.  However,  an  analysis  of girls'  school
enrollment  indicates that a majority of the provinces covered by the program  experienced
a significant improvement.  The FFE program  seems to have increased school  attendance
by about 16 percent but reduced child  labor much less (by about 4 percent).
All these findings are  subject to limitations.  For example,  the fact that schooling  is not
actually  displacing  work  but  leisure  may  be  a  natural  assumption  to  make  in  the
developed  world but not necessarily  in the  impoverished  developing  world, especially in
a  rural  context.  Also,  the  interpretation  of data  is  often  blurred  as  a  relatively  large
number of children are reportedly neither attending school nor going to work.  It could be
that the many (or even most) children  who are affected  by a program  are those who fall
into that category.  In addition,  as is well  known, targeting  is essential to these  kinds of
program  but it  often  emerges that  observable  household  characteristics  are  a very  poor
predictor  of  placement  in  the  program.  This  could  mean  either  that  the  community
adopted criteria other than need to select  households  for the program  or that observable
characteristics  are poor indicators of actual  need.
In this respect we cannot but emphasize the need for monitoring and evaluation of various
programs.  This  also  includes  adequate  supervisory  mechanisms.  There  is  an
understandable  desire on the part of program financers to ensure that as much of  the funds
allocated  to a program as possible should go to the intended  beneficiaries.  This is all very
well, but it has to be understood that the  success of a program,  as of any other activity,  is
measured  by  the  output  not  by the  input.  Spending  10  percent  more,  say,  on  buying
children's  time  is  no  guarantee  that  child  labor  will  decrease  more  than  if the  same
amount of money were spent in other ways. Hypothetically  speaking, better results might
vibe  achieved  if that  extra  10  percent  were  used  to  increase  the  cost-effectiveness  of
existing expenditure.
It could happen, for example, that money is misspent on buying the time of children who
would not work  anyway  or buying the time of boys who would  otherwise  help with the
harvest rather than of girls at risk of ending up, say,  in prostitution. It could also happen
that parents send their children to school in order to qualify for the subsidy and then make
their children  work as much as possible outside  school hours. If this were the case, child
labor would not be reduced,  and school  attendance  would  not produce  good educational
results  because  the children  would  be  exhausted  to take  advantage  of it.  Better  results
might be obtained by spending less for buying children's time and more on ensuring that
the children selected are the right ones or that parents deliver on their side of the contract.
Thus,  there  is  a potential  trade-off  between  resources  that  are  directly  distributed  and
resources that are used to increase the effectiveness of the program.  In fact,  an analysis of
nearly  1,500  World Bank  projects suggests the  marginal  benefit  of program  supervision
tends to exceed the marginal cost.
Concluding remarks
The arguments and evidence that we have assembled  in this Handbook suggest that child
labor is not a problem that can be solved with slogans and ringing declarations. They also
make  it  clear  that  child  labor  cuts  across  policy  boundaries:  health,  education,  labor
market, capital market,  social  security,  criminal  law, international  peace  keeping,  income
growth, and distribution all have a bearing on child labor.  Therefore,  reducing child labor
cannot be regarded as just another policy  issue alongside others;  it is only one dimension
of many, possibly all, policies  in the field of development.
Direct  forms of intervention,  based  on the  idea  of "buying"  children's  time,  obviously
have an  immediate  effect,  and are highly  appropriate  in  crisis  situations where  children
are  at risk  of ending up in physically,  socially  or morally hazardous  situations - such as
soldiers or prostitutes.  In other situations, however,  the long-term effect of such measures
has yet to  be  proven.  The evidence  suggests that  indirect  forms of intervention,  which
ensure that it  is no longer in  the  interests of parents to send  their children  to work,  have
viimore certain and, above all,  longer lasting effects.  Measures that reduce child  labor as a
by-product of increased productivity  of adults and social equity  are particularly desirable
and  advisable.  Among  such measures  that are  particularly  worthy  of consideration,  we
have identified  health policies that directly and indirectly reduce morbidity and mortality,
educational  policies  that  reduce  the  marginal  cost  of  school  attendance,  and  social
security  policies that  reduce  the demand  for children  as a form  of investment.  Many  of
these  policies, are  conducive  to  economic  growth,  which  is  itself reduces  child  labor.
However,  growth  alone  is  not the solution  because  it takes too  long  to have  any effect
child labor. Also, growth  achieved by other types of policy may make matters a lot worse
during the adjustment period.
This Handbook makes  it  clear  that  child  labor,  in  all  its  forms,  has  common  causes
worldwide  but  that  the  efficacy  of  the  same  policy  can  differ  substantially  across
countries and between rural and urban areas of the same country. Therefore,  interventions
should be based on a detailed knowledge of the characteristics  of  the target area.
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Introduction
What  is  child  labor?  The  International  Labor Office  answers:  any activity  other
than  study or play, remunerated  or unremunerated,  carried out by a person under the age
of 15.  According  to this  definition,  78  million individuals  in  1990,  8 percent of this age
group,  are engaged  in child  labor (see Table  1).  Most of them are in Africa,  South Asia,
and Latin America,  but they can also be found in the rich north of the world,  for example,
in  US  agriculture.  This  grand  total  includes  comparatively  harmless  activities  such  as
housework  at  one  end  but  also  extremely  harmful  ones  like  begging,  thieving,
prostitution,  and  soldiering  at the  other.  In the  middle,  there  is  a continuum  of work
activities,  characterized  by varying degrees of harmfulness.
TABLE  1: CHILD LABOR IN THE WORLD
Numnber of working children-under 15 years of
- ,  ..'  age (thousands)
.1980  1985  1990
World  87,867  80,611  78,516
Africa  14,950  14,536  16,763
Americas  4,122  4,536  4,723
Asia  68,324  61,210  56,784
East Asia  39,725  33,463  22,448
Southeast Asia  6,518  6,079  5,587
South Asia  20,192  19,834  27,639
Source: Ashagrie (1993)
All  forms of labor, even if morally and  physically innocuous, take children's time
away  from  schooling  and  homework  and,  thus,  can  have  a  cost  in  terms  of foregone
education.  All except the most harmful types of labor can be a form of learning by doing.
Leaving  aside the  worst abuses,  therefore,  they  can constitute  a valuable  alternative  or
complement to formal education.  Where children  are  under the control of their family of
origin, their labor brings immediate  benefits to the family as a whole. In some cases,  it is
' University  of Florence,  CESifo  and  IZA;  University  of Rome "Vergate"  and  UNICEF,  and  The  World
Bank.  The  views expressed  in this paper are  the authors and  should not be attributed  in any  manner to  the
World  Bank or its affiliated  institutions  or the countries they  represent.  The authors  acknowledge  useful
comments and suggestions  by Amit Dar, Carol Rogers, University of Florence, CESifo and  IZA.the only way in which  the child can receive  any formal education  at all or even to remain
within the family. The issue is thus extremely complex.  There are no simple solutions.
TABLE  2: LABOR PARTICIPATION RATES OF CHILDREN AGED 10-14 YEARS
'1950  1960~  1970  1980  990'  1995'  2000  2010
World  27.57  24.81  22.30  19.91  14.65  13.02  11.32  8.44
Africa  38.42  35.88  33.05  30.97  27.87  26.23  24.92  22.52
Lat. Am. &  Carib..  19.36  16.53  14.60  12.64  11.23  9.77  8.21  5.47
Asia  36.06  32.26  28.35  23.42  15.19  12.77  10.18  5.60
Europe  6.49  3.52  1.62  0.42  0.10  0.06  0.04  0.02
Ethiopia  52.95  50.75  48.51  46.32  43.47  42.30  41.10  38.79
Brazil  23.53  22.19  20.33  19.02  17.78  16.09  14.39  10.94
China  47.85  43.17  39.03  30.48  15.24  11.55  7.86  0.00
India  35.43  30.07  25.46  21.44  16.68  14.37  12.07  7.46
Italy  29.11  10.91  4.12  1.55  0.43  0.38  0.33  0.27
Source: ILO (1996)
Note:  Numbers for 2000 are estimates and numbers for 2010 are projections
These brief considerations  set the agenda for what follows.  In Chapter  1, we deal
with  observation  and  measurement  issues.  How  does  one  go  about  identifying  the
different kinds of child labor?  Which  clues should one look  for in order to establish the
consequences of labor on the child's health,  life expectancy,  education,  and so on?
In Chapters  2  and  3, we  look for explanations  of child labor.  If children  are  still
with their family of origin,  the reasons  why  the children  are  working  have  to be traced
back to parental  decisions.  If they  are  not,  the  causes go  back  to a parental  decision to
expel  the  child  from  the  home,  to  the child's  decision  to  leave  the  household,  or to  a
catastrophic event that left the child without a family.
Chapters  4  to  8  provide  empirical  evidence  of the  factors  affecting  parental
decisions  in the  great  majority of cases  where children  are under parental  control  and  at
the  consequences  of  these  decisions  for  various  aspects  of  the  child's  welfare.
Throughout,  we draw primarily on country studies for which we were directly responsible
but also on the work of others.
Chapter  9  looks  at the  structure  of child  labor markets and  at their  interrelations
with adult labor markets and with the economic  system as a whole.
Chapter  10 examines  the effects  of different  combinations of policies  and tries to
establish which policy is more appropriate  in different circumstances.
Chapter  11  is  dedicated  to  the  pathology  of child  labor,  in  other  words,  those
activities that can do no possible good to the child. The reason  for treating these  activities
last is partly that the sources of information are different from those on which we draw in
2the  preceding  chapters  but  also  that  the  lessons  learned  from  the  analysis  of  non-
pathological activities also apply to the pathological  ones.
Finally,  Chapter  12  draws  the  various  threads  together,  and  the  Bibliography
provides  a guide  to the  literature on this  increasingly  but not yet  extensively  cultivated
field.
3Chapter 1
Identifying Child Labor and Measuring Child Welfare
How does one  go about identifying  the  different kinds  of child  labor?  Which  clues
should one  look for in order to establish the consequences  of labor  on the child's health,
life expectancy,  education,  and  so on?  A  major source  of information  about  children
living with  a family,  not necessarily  the one of origin,  are  household surveys.  Children
living  on their  own  are a  different  story.  If they  are  not  institutionalized,  information
about them  is  inevitably sketchy.  Apart  from  special  studies,  such as  Chatterjee  (1992),
one has to rely on local authority estimates, often  impressionistic,  and on police  or press
reports.
1.1 How to get the information
One  major  source  of  information  about  children  living  with  their  families  is
household  surveys.  In some cases,  these surveys have children  as their primary objective;
more commonly,  they are multi-purpose  investigations  that happen to include  questions
about children.  Good  examples,  widely  used  in the  present  handbook,  are  the NCAER
(National Council  for Applied Economic Research) survey of rural Indian households and
the  LSMS  (Living  Standard  Measurement  Study)  surveys  of Vietnam  and  Morocco.
Well-aimed  questions and the way in which the answer is obtained can elicit a great deal
of  information.  It  cannot  be  over-stressed  that,  given  cost  limitations,  in-depth
questioning  and accurate  reporting on a sensitive subject like the status of children  should
be given very high weight in designing the sample.
A general  rule is that questions should be addressed to the household  member who
is most  likely  to  give  a well-informed  answer.  Thus,  questions  concerning  fertility  and
child  care are  better addressed  to the mother  than to the  father.  Also,  wherever  possible
(cost  considerations  here  come  to  the  fore),  answers  should  be  cross-checked  with
different  household  members  or  with  independent  sources.  For  example,  information
given by parents about school  attendance  should  be cross-checked  with the child or with
the child's teacher.  When the  respondent tells the survey  interviewer about children who
4live  with  the  family,  the  interviewer  should  actually  see  and  count  those  children  for
verification  purposes.  With some plausible excuse, the interviewer  should ask the parents
to  fetch  the child.  If the  survey  requires  the child  to  be  measured  and  weighed  (more
about this later), this should be done by or in the presence of the interviewer.
1.2 What age limits define a child?
Fixing the borderline  between  childhood and  adulthood  is a daunting task.  Many
aspects  need  to  be  considered:  physical  and  psychological  development,  social  norms,
economic  environment,  and  so  on.  To  a certain  extent,  the  borderline  is  endogenous
while  there is no doubt that  a 6-year old  is a child, a  14-year  old may be  regarded  as  a
child if attending school and  depending on parental  support but may well be regarded  as
an adult if working for a living.
Little  is gained by getting involved  in this type of discussion.  Therefore,  we shall
follow  the  approach  (common  to most of the analyses  of child  labor) of defining  child
labor as work performed by people between  the age of 6 or 7 and  15 or  16.  This time span
coincides,  more  or less, with  that of primary  and  middle-secondary  education.  Children
below the age of 6 are  unlikely to be capable of performing  any useful work  other than
pathological  activities  like  begging.  Children  older  than  the  age  at  which  children
normally complete secondary education  can no longer unarguably be considered a child.
1.3 How to establish a child's labor  status
The child labor supply has many dimensions,  and  it is important to be clear about
the kind of information  that is needed to establish  its extent and characteristics.  The data
collected  should  account  in  as  much detail  as  possible  for the  child's  entire  day.  At  a
minimum,  it should make  it possible  to classify a child as working,  attending  school, or
doing both.  It should  also provide  a breakdown of his or her work activities,  in the first
place between work within the home or on the  family farm or business  and work outside
the  household.  The nature  of the  work performed  by the child  should also  be specified,
not only to establish how damaging  it might be but also for the sake of comparability.  For
example,  performing  household  chores and  looking  after younger  siblings  is counted  as
work  in  some  surveys  but  not  in  others,  and  it  is  sometimes  difficult  to  distinguish
domestic  chores from  work on the family farm. Ideally,  one  would also want information
on the intensity of the work,  because this, together with the number of hours dedicated to
5it,  is what  determines whether  the work  is  really in competition  with  formal education.
Working conditions also influence the outcome of education.
Analyses of child  labor and education that do  not take these various dimensions
into account can yield contradictory  results.  Here,  too, it is essential that the  interviewer
cross-checks  the  information  provided  by  parents  with  the  child,  maybe  by  indirect
questioning  (independent  corroboration  is unfortunately  more  difficult on the  subject of
work  conditions  than  on  the  subject  of school  attendance).  The  length  of the  child's
working day and the sector in which he or she is employed are obviously important pieces
of information  for evaluating  the intensity of the work and the hazards to which the child
is  exposed.  The  former  also  helps  analysts  to  evaluate  how  much  the  child's  labor
contributes to the household's  income and to the household's welfare.  The main problem,
in  this  respect,  is  finding  out  how  much  time  children  spend  performing  household
chores,  as this is typically not asked about  in surveys,  except in those that contain a time
budget module.
TABLE 3A: CHILD LABOR PARTICIPATION RATES IN RURAL  INDIA,  BY SECTOR,  AGE,
AND  SEX  (1994)
All  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16
Agriculture  1.93  2.31  3.44  3.25  3.65  4.03  4.73  5.74  7.17  8.06  12.06
Non Agric.  1.02  0.88  1.44  1.35  1.64  1.67  2.28  2.26  2.82  3.11  4.39
Household  4.11  4.41  4.91  5.91  7.04  6.3  7.81  8.53  10.33  12.57  16.31
Total  7.06  7.6  9.79  10.51  12.33  12.0  14.82  16.53  20.32  23.74  32.76
Male  6  -7  8  9  10  11.  12  13-  14  15  16
Agriculture  1.67  2.16  3.82  3.36  3.23  4.27  5.19  5.81  7.83  9.05  13.31
Non Agric.  0.82  0.80  1.38  1.49  1.47  1.82  2.47  2.43  3.59  3.96  6.12
Household  4.52  4.20  4.46  4.26  5.26  5.40  6.35  5.55  6.40  5.43  6.56
Total  7.01  7.16  9.66  9.11  9.96  11.49  14.01  13.79  17.82  18.44  25.99
Female  6  .7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16
Agriculture  2.22  2.45  3.01  3.13  4.13  3.77  4.20  5.67  6.41  6.78  10.45
Non Agric.  1.25  0.97  1.51  1.19  1.84  1.51  2.05  2.08  1.93  2.01  2.19
Household  3.66  4.63  5.42  7.67  9.05  7.28  9.51  11.86  14.85  21.73  28.79
Total  7.13  8.05  9.94  11.99  15.02  12.56  15.76  19.61  23.19  30.52  41.43
As an example  of the kind of information that a household  survey can provide,  we
show in Table  3A,  the age profile  of children's  labor  in the already  mentioned  NCAER
6survey of rural India.  For children  of any age, the  place  where they are  most frequently
reported  to  be employed  is in  the household  itself.  Leaving  this information  out  would
result  in  a serious  underestimation  of the work commitment  of children,  particularly  of
girls.
Table 3B, based  on the 1991  and  1998  LSMS surveys,  gives  similar information
for Morocco.  Here, "family help "  is the child's most frequent form of work (curiously,  it
becomes  predominantly  female only in the second of the two surveys).  The percentage  of
Moroccan  children  engaged  in  this  activity  is  much  larger  than  that  of rural  Indian
children  engaged  in household work, but this  is only because "family  help" does not just
include  household  work.  It also includes all cases in which the child works for his or her
own  parents  and  does  not  receive  a  wage.  This  is  an  example  of the  ambiguities  and
comparability problems that arise in measuring and categorizing child labor.
TABLE 3B:  EMPLOYMENT DISTRIBUTION  OF WORKING CHILDREN  IN MOROCCO (%)
..  . ,.-  - 1991
.___________  o  TOTAL  MALE  r  FEMALE
Wage  workers  11.1  9.8  12.7
Family help  84.1  82.4  85.9
Apprentices  3.7  6.3  0.8
1998
-____._______TOTAL  MALE  FEMALE
Wage workers  14.3  14.3  14.3
Family help  76.8  72.4  81.8
Apprentices  6.3  9.9  2.3
*Figures subject to missing values
In many developing countries,  a number of children are reported  as doing nothing
(in  other words,  as neither working,  nor attending school).  These groups of children  can
sometimes  be relatively large (20 percent or more of the age group in rural India or in the
whole  of  Morocco,  for  example)  and  require  careful  scrutiny.  Three  alternative
interpretations of this "idle" condition are possible.
First, these  children  may  really be doing  nothing.  Project  officials  in developing
countries  maintain that some children  are not sent to school (maybe for lack of money or
because there  is no school sufficiently close to home) and cannot be usefully employed in
productive activities. This is certainly possible, but it is not always true.
Second, parents  may  report their children  as being  idle even though  in  fact  they
are  actually  working,  either  (at  best)  because  work  by  children  under  a  certain  age  is
forbidden  or  (at  worst)  because  their  children  are  engaged  in  illegal  or  dangerous
7activities.  In extreme  cases, the child  might not even  be  in  the household  any more-
having even been sold.
Third,  parents may have misinterpreted  the question,  and reported a child  as not
working simply because  he or she is not doing so at the time of the interview,  although he
or she may work (perhaps even intensely) at other times of the year.
Another  area  where  misreporting  can  be  a  problem  is household  chores.  For
example,  in the Morocco  survey that has already been mentioned,  the questionnaire  only
asked  whether the child works or not.  If the answer  was negative,  no further  questions
were asked.  In cases such  as this,  it is most likely that those children  who were reported
as neither attending school nor working actually performed household  chores. In the India
survey,  by  contrast,  the  questionnaire  asked  about  the  activities  performed  by  each
household  member,  including  help  with  domestic  chores.  It is thus more  difficult to  be
confident  that the  children reported  as neither  going to  school nor working  were  doing
household chores.
By making the questionnaire  unambiguous  and cross-checking  the answers as far
as  possible,  survey  designers  can  thus  eliminate  or  drastically  reduce the  incidence  of
apparent  idleness  and  make  it  easier  to measure  and  analyze  actual  idleness  (with  all
attendant hazards).  It must be  kept in  mind that children who neither attend school  nor
engage in any verifiable activity are  not visible to the wider community and, thus, may be
more  exposed  to physical  and  moral  risks.  In  extreme  cases,  they  may even  have  been
expelled  from the  family.  This  is why it  is important,  as  already  indicated,  that children
should  be actually seen  and counted by the interviewer.  Where the condition  of children
is the  primary  objective  of the  survey,  accuracy  of information  should take  precedence
over all other considerations.  Tables  4A, 4B, and 4C  illustrate the point by showing the
distribution  of  children  by  work/study  category  and  by  sex  in  India,  Vietnam,  and
Morocco.
TABLE 4A: WORK/STUDY  STATUS OF CHILDREN IN INDIA BY SEX (%), 1994
Boys  Giirls,  All
Work only  7.9  13.2  10.4
Neither work nor study  20.5  29.7  24.9
Study only  66.7  53.7  60.5
Work and study  4.9  3.3  4.1
8According to the NCAER survey of rural India (Table 4A), nearly two-thirds of all
children  (but just  over  half  of girls)  attend  school.  A  majority  of children  (over  60
percent) only studies but does not work.  The second  largest category (25 percent)  is that
of children reported as  doing nothing.  The  rest of them only work (about  10  percent) or
attend  school  and  work  at the  same time  (less than  5 percent).  Despite the  inclusion  of
domestic  chores  in the work category,  girls are  still more  likely to be reported  as  doing
nothing than boys.
The enrollment rate is substantially  higher,  more than 90 percent,  in the Vietnam
surveys  (Table  4B).  Boys  are  more  likely  to  go  to  school  than  girls,  but  gender
differences  are not  as large  as  in  India and  decrease  between  1993  and  1998.  Between
those two dates,  the number of children studying  full time sharply  increased. For children
of primary-school  age, this change was associated with a reduction  in the number of those
who were  working  and  attending  school  at  the  same  time.  In  the older  age  range,  the
increase  in the number of children  studying  full time was  at the expense  of those  only
working as well as of those both working and studying.
TABLE 4B: WORK/STUDY  STATUS OF CHILDREN IN VIETNAM  BY SEX (%)
1993  1998
_____  _  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls
School and work  23.9  20.7  17.1  15.4
School only  64.3  60.5  75.7  75.1
Work only  9.8  14.8  5.3  6.6
Neither work nor study  2.1  4.1  1.6  2.9
In Morocco (Table 4C), by contrast, the number of children working and attending
school  at the same time  is negligible.  The share of "idle" children is higher than in India,
but the Moroccan  figure probably includes a large proportion of children,  especially girls,
who are actually engaged  in household  worlc. It is interesting to observe that the increase
in  school  attendance  between  1991  and  1998  came  mainly  from  a  reduction  in  the
"idleness" rate.
TABLE4C:  WORK/STUDY STATUS OF CHILDREN  IN MOROCCO BY SEX (%)
1991  1998
Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls
School and work  0.2  0.1  1.1  0.4
School only  68.3  48.1  72.2  59.3
Work only  18.1  15.9  13.9  13.5
Neither school nor work  13.2  35.8  12.7  26.7
9The  Moroccan  data also  contain  large  gender  and  regional  differences.  Table  5
shows  that child labor participation  is much  higher  in rural than  in urban  areas.  Gender
differences,  substantial  everywhere,  are  particularly  large  in rural  areas.  In  1991,  only  a
quarter of rural  girls, as opposed to more than half of rural boys and nearly 80 percent of
urban  girls, attended  school. In  1998,  schooling  increased substantially  for all,  especially
for girls in rural areas,  but both gender and regional  differentials remained  large.
TABLE 5: WORK/STUDY  STATUS  OF CHILDREN IN MOROCCO BY  SEX AND AREA
1991  Urban  Rural
Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls
School and work  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2
School only  86.3  79.3  56.3  25.7
Work only  4.9  4.3  27.1  24.2
Neither school nor work  8.6  16.3  16.5  49.9
1998
School  and work  0.4  0.1  1.9  0.8
School only  87.5  81.5  56.9  37.5
Work only  5.6  3.5  22.3  23.4
Neither school nor work  6.6  14.9  18.8  38.4
The intensity of work performned  is an important indicator of the potential  dangers
of child labor,  in terms of both  school achievement and/or health hazards.  Some data sets
contain  information  on  the  number  of  hours  worked,  and  this  makes  it  possible  to
construct  some  measure  of work intensity.  Table 6  illustrates this  point using data from
the Vietnam LSMS surveys.
TABLE 6: HOURS OF WORK SUPPLIED IN VIETNAM  (WEEKLY  AVERAGES)
Adults  Children  Children  Children working
(all)  working only  and attending school
1993  33  21  L  28  16
1998  33  1_  7  22  1_1
In  1993, working children  supplied an average of 21 hours per week,2 just over 60
percent of the adult average.  However, the labor supply of "work only" children (in other
words,  of children  who did  not attend school) -- 28 hours  -- was about  90 percent of the
2 Assuming 50 working weeks per year.
10adult average. "Work and study" children supplied  substantially  fewer hours. In  1998, the
number of hours supplied  by children was about 30 percent  lower than  in  1993.  While  it
is easy to interpret the reduction in the hours supplied by "work and  study" children as a
shift  towards  human  capital  investment,  the  reduction  in  the  hours  worked  by  "work
only"  children  may  be  due  to  a  change  in the  age  or gender  composition  of the  labor
supply or in the type of employment  in which the children  were engaged.
TABLE  7: HOURS WORKED BY CHILDREN IN VIETNAM  AS PERCENTAGE OF HOURS WORKED
BY ADULTS  BY FORM OF EMPLOYMENT (WEEKLY AVERAGES)
All sectors  Family farm  Family business  Wage
employment
1993  10.6  12.5  5.8  3.6
1998  1.8  2.2  1.9  1.6
In  the  absence  of reliable  earnings  or productivity  measures,  the  importance  of
child  labor for family income is captured by the ratio of work hours supplied by children
to work hours  supplied by adults.  As Table  7  shows in the case Vietnam,  in  1993,  child
labor was almost  11  percent  of adult  labor.3 The  share of child  labor,  while  low  in  the
wage employment sector, was substantially higher among the self-employed,  particularly
in  farming  where  it  amounted  to  about  13  percent  of the  hours  supplied  by  adults.
Between  1993  and  1998, there was a dramatic fall  in the child/adult  labor ratio (with child
labor at less than 2 percent of adult  labor),  especially  in  far  m  self-employment  (from  12
to 2 percent).
1.4 Measuring children's welfare
Child labor may be regarded  as an ill in itself,  but it can also be evaluated  also in
terms  of its  effects  on  children's  welfare.  We  shall  be  concerned  primarily  with  the
material  aspects  of  welfare  (such  as  life  and  health  expectancy  and  future  earning
capacity).  Other dimensions  of welfare,  related to the child's "capabilities"  and  with the
concept of "freedom",  pose  problems  of measurement  that have  hardly been dealt with
until now,  by researchers of the subject.
3The  ratio was computed considering the total aduli  labor supply.  Had we  considered  only households with
working children,  the ratio would have obviously been  higher.
11In  the  case  of children,  even  material  welfare  is  difficult  to  evaluate.  In  the
absence  of information  on  the  allocation  of consumption  among  household  members,
overall  household  income  or  consumption  is  not  a  reliable  predictor  of the  material
welfare of its individual members, particularly  of weaker ones like children. Especially in
developing  countries,  one  comes  across  situations  where  resources  are  very  unequally
allocated  between  adults  and  children  and  between  males  and  females  within  a  given
household.  Even  direct  questioning  about  intra-household  allocation  of food  and  other
resources  might not elicit truthful or,  at any rate, sufficiently accurate  responses.  Indirect
indicators  are,  therefore,  needed to evaluate  even  food  intake.4 Only indirect  indicators
can be used when trying to measure capabilities  in a broader sense.
The  child's  current  health  status  is  of primary  importance  in  any  definition  of
welfare.  Information  on  past  morbidity  is sometimes  gathered  in surveys.  The NCAER
India  survey,  for  example,  has  a  separate  questionnaire  seeking  detailed  information
about the  incidence  of various  kinds of symptoms and  what actions  were  consequently
taken  to  alleviate  them.  Life  and  morbidity  expectancy  are  other  obvious  candidates.
Indeed,  the  probability  of  survival  (or  its  complement,  the  probability  of death)  is
arguably the best composite indicator of economic  success or failure (Sen,  1995).
The probability of surviving into the next stage of life (school age or adulthood  as
the case may be) is not directly observable, but various predictors,  based on simple height
and  weight  measurement,  have  been  developed  in  the  biometric  literature  (see,  for
example, de Onis and Habicht,  1996). Unless the survey provides retroactive  information
about the child's height and  weight, however,  knowing the child's present and past health
status  does  not  allow  one  to  establish  a  link  between  these  outcomes  and  the  said
measurements  using  the data  provided  by  the survey  itself.  To establish  that  link,  one
would  need to  have  a set of longitudinal  data,  following  a panel of individuals  through
time. Such data are often collected in developed countries, but the conclusions that can be
drawn from developed country data5 are generally not applicable to developing countries.
Tables 8-9 show how an indicator of nutritional  status, body mass (weight divided
by  height  squared),  varies  with  the work/study  status  of the  child  in  the India  survey.
Body mass  is a  predictor of the  child's  probability  of survival  to,  and health  status  in,
4  Anthropometric  indices,  based  on simple  height and  weight measurement,  provide  useful  information  on
nutritional status.  For an example of how they can be used to infer living standards  and the effects of policy,
see Ismail  and Micklewright (1997) and Cigno, Rosati,  and Tzannatos (2000).
5  See, for example,  Fogel (1993) and Waaler (1984).
12subsequent  stages of life.6 Looking  at the raw data, we cannot  say that working children
fare  worse  than  children  who  attend  school.  Working  girls  up  to  the  age of  10  and
working boys up to the age of 7 have higher body mass than  their contemporaries  who
attend  school  (children  who work and  attend school at the  same time fare worst of all).
At higher ages, there is no clear pattern.7
TABLE 8: BODY  MASS*  BY AGE AND  WORK/STUDY  STATUS  IN  RURAL INDA  (BoYs)
STATUS/AGE  6  7  8  9  10  11  12
Work Only  15.74  15.30  15.02  14.41  15.64  15.39  16.13
Study Only  14.87  14.88  15.19  14.99  15.26  15.41  15.54
Work and Study  14.50  14.35  14.62  14.70  14.83  15.36  15.53
Neither Work nor Study  15.20  14.99  15.16  15.39  15.41  15.24  15.91
*Weight/height  squared.
TABLE 9: BODY MASS BY AGE AND WORK/STUDY  STATUS IN RURAL INDIA  (G  mLS
STATUS/AGE  6  7  8  9  10  11  12
Work Only  15.30  15.64  14.79  15.11  15.24  15.04  15.49
Study Only  14.82  14.66  14.78  14.71  14.85  15.08  15.63
Work and Study  14.77  14.43  15.05  13.95  14.64  15.02  15.43
Neither Work nor Study  14.80  15.75  14.91  15.09  15.05  15.41  15.40
The  raw  data  reported  in these  tables  do  not  reveal  obvious  differences  in  the
nutritional  status of boys and girls.  Econometric  analysis  (Cigno,  Rosati, and Tzannatos,
2000)  reveals,  however,  that the body mass  of girls  is systematically  lower than  that of
8 boys  when  all  other  factors  are  held  constant.  More  to  the  point,  these  data  refer  to
school-age  girls,  in other words, to girls whose  families valued  them  sufficiently to  give
them the resources necessary to survive to that age. There  is ample  evidence,  on the other
hand, that in some parts of the developing world the proportion of women to men is lower
6  See,  for example,  de Onis and Habicht (1996),  Klasen  (1996),  and Waaler (1984).  Fogel  (1993)  argues
that weight and  height enter separately into the determination  of the survival  probability,  so that the  same
body-mass  ratio  could  be  associated  with  different  survival  rates.  Indeed,  Fogel  and  Waaler  report
evidence  that  the  relationship  between  survival  and  body  mass has  a  reverse-U  shape  where  adults  in
developed  countries  are  concerned.  Given  the age-range  we  are  considering,  however,  and  the  fact that
practically  all of the children  in our sample  are undernourished  by western  standards,  we may reasonably
take the relationship to be upward-sloping  throughout  in our case.
7 Of course, a child  engaged  in energetic  forms of work is likely to have a higher ratio of muscle to  fat and,
thus, to weigh more than a non-working contemporary  with the  same body volume.  Also, a child  born with
more muscle  is more likely to be selected  for energetic work activities  (Dasgupta,  1997).  On the other hand,
other things being equal,  a working child needs more  food to reach  any given  body volume.  It thus seems
unlikely that, of two children with the same sex, age, and body mass, the one  who works  will have received
less nutrition than the one who does  not.
8 For evidence from  West Africa,  see Haddad  and Hoddinott  (1994).
13than  demography  would  lead  one to  expect.  This  imbalance,  present  also  in the  Indian
survey from which Tables 5 and 6 are drawn,  is symptomatic of excess female (compared
to male)  mortality due to infanticide  and to undernourishment  in the crucial  early stages
of life.9
9 See  Sen (1989), Coale (1991),  and Klasen (1996).
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Why Do Children Work?
Most children  are under the control of their own parents  or,  at any  rate, of their
family of origin. Therefore, their welfare cannot be regarded  in isolation from that of their
parents and other relatives. Even if the child was expelled from his or her family of origin
or ran away from  it, his or her present condition can  be traced  back to parental  decisions
(it makes  little difference whether  the child jumped  or was pushed). The  situation when a
child  leaves  a family  because of some  catastrophic  event is different.  For example,  large
numbers of African  children are,  or are expected to become,  orphans as a result of wars,
famines, and the AIDS epidemic.
We will discuss children who are on their own  for such external,  catastrophic  reasons  in
Chapter  11.  In the present  chapter and in the next, we will be  concerned with the way in
which parents  make their decisions  and  how these  affect children.  What we really mean
in asking why do children work  is why  do parents make them  work. At this stage,  we do
not go into the issue of the balance of power among father,  mother, and other adult family
members,  but  we  are  aware  that  these  people  may  have  differing  and  possibly
contradictory  objectives.  A change  in  the balance  of power  in  favor  of the mother,  for
example,  is thought to benefit children  ("women's agency").'°
2.1 The structure of household decisions
Households have multiple objectives. For a start,  as mentioned at the beginning of
the last chapter, material consumption  is not the only dimension of welfare.  Other factors,
such  as  health,  "freedom",  and  so  on  also affect  the  happiness  or  satisfaction  of each
household.  Moreover,  the  household  faces  a  problem  of  inter-temporal  resource
allocation;  the  decisions  it makes today will influence the quantity of resources  available
to it in the future.  This is particularly  relevant in the case of child labor, where the choice
10  For empirical  evidence,  see  Haddad  and  Hoddinott  (1994)  and  Hoddinott  and  Haddad  (1995).  For the
theoretical  argument,  see  Manser  and  Brown  (1980).  Eswaran  (2001),  however,  argues  that,  while
15is not only between consumption  and other activities today but also between present  and
future consumption.
We may assume that parents care about the present and future  well-being of their
children.  However,  as they care also about their own well-being, this does not imply that
parents  will  do  everything  in  their  power  to  foster  their  children's  interests.  Their
decisions will be a compromise  between  ultimately  conflicting  objectives.  Indeed,  many
aspects of parental behavior cannot be fully explained by the alternative  (and, on the face
of it, opposite)  hypothesis  that  parents  are totally  self-interested,  and that  they  expend
resources  on  in  their  offspring  only  because  they  get  some  direct  return  from  that
expenditure.'
For example, there is ample evidence that pension coverage discourages fertility.'2
Taken  together  with  evidence  that  aging  parents  receive  support  from  their  grown-up
children,'3 this phenomenon  is consistent  with the hypothesis that parents regard  having
children as a way to re-allocate  their resources over their own lifecycle.  In other words, if
the  parents  invest  in their  children's  welfare,  their  children  will  look  after the  parents
when  they are  old.  Of course,  this  attitude  is most likely  to prevail  in situations  where
capital  markets  are  not  sufficiently  developed  to  provide  a  viable  alternative  to  filial
support (more  about this in the next chapter).  However, the  need for offspring to support
their elderly parents  can  still  be relevant  even when capital  markets are well  developed,
because the market does not offer perfect substitutes  for some of the services provided  by
one's  own children.  A remarkable  finding  of recent research  is that,  even  in  the highly
developed  economies  of North America,  Western  Europe,  and  Japan,  household  saving
and  fertility behavior  is consistent with the hypothesis that children are regarded by their
parents as a kind of capital asset.'4
In  practice,  it  is not  very  helpful  to  dwell  on  whether  parental  motivations  are
altruistic  or egoistic.  What matters  is how  much value  parents put on resources  invested
in their children,  not whether  this evaluation  reflects  love  or simply the  expectation of a
share  in  the  fruits  of  the  investment.  Parental  decisions  concern,  essentially,  the
benefiting  children  generally,  female  empowerment  could have negative  effects on the survival  probability
offemale children.
" See Cigno (1993)  and Rosati  (1996).
12  Among  others,  Nugent  and  Gillaspy  (1983),  Entwisle  and  Winegarden  (1984),  and  Cigno  and  Rosati
(1992,  1996).
13  For example,  Cigno, Giannelli,  and Rosati  (1998).
14  Cigno and Rosati,  (1992,  1996,  1997).
16allocation  of resources  among  alternative  uses,  in particular  the  use  of each  household
member's own time, the distribution of income over time and across household  members,
and  the  number  of births. All  these  decisions  are  interrelated  and cannot  be  studied  in
isolation.
Two points have to be  kept  in  mind where  fertility decisions are  concerned.  The
first  is that parents cannot  determine  the number and timing of births with certainty.  The
second is that parents are not so much interested in the number of births as in the number
of children who will  survive  into  adulthood.  By one  set of actions (frequency  of sexual
intercourse,  adoption  of contraceptive  or fertility-inducing  practices,  and  so on), parents
then  condition the  probability  distribution  of fertility  outcomes.  By another  (the health
care  and  nutrition  that they  give  to  the  child),  they  condition  each  child's  probability
distribution of survival to each subsequent  stage of life.'5 Both sets of actions also affect,
directly or indirectly,  the lifetime morbidity  prospects of surviving children.' 6
The  complexity  of the  household  problem  does  not  permit  us  to  draw  simple
schematizations.  Even  intuitively appealing  ones can be highly misleading.  Consider,  for
example,  the  "children  first"  implicit  or explicit assumption,  often  made  in  child  labor
analyses.  In  a  nutshell,  this  is  what  is  assumed.  Parents  are  concerned  about  their
children's welfare.  In all circumstances,  children are better off if they go to school than if
they  go  to  work.  Hence,  parents  will  send  their  children  out  to  work  only  if  the
household's  income  falls  below  a  certain  critical  level.  Even  if this  were  a  correct
representation  of parental preferences (in other words,  if it were true that parents put their
children's interests before their own,  come what may), the approach would  still be flawed
because  it implies  that  it  is  necessarily  better  for the  child  to  go  to  school  and  have  a
subsistence  level  of consumption  than  not  to  go to  school  and enjoy  a  higher  level  of
consumption.  This is far from necessarily being the case in general.
Consider the following example.  Suppose that a child is working.  Suppose that his
or her wage rate rises enough to bring household  income above the critical threshold. The
children-first  approach  implies  that  the  child's  labor  supply  should  be  reduced  until
household  income  is back to the critical  level.  This is  not necessarily  in the child's best
interest: the extra income could  buy the child more  food or, if s/he goes to school,  more
educational  material.  Indeed,  if the  child  does  go  to  school,  better  nutrition  would
'I  See Cigno (1998) and Cigno and Pinal (2001).
16Not only nutrition and  health care, but also birth spacing is relevant  in this respect
17improve  his or her educational  performance.  Up to a point, child  labor could  thus help,
rather  than  hinder,  human  capital  accumulation.' 7 The  child's extra  income  could also
buy  more  maternal  attention  by reducing  the  amount  of time  his or her  mother has to
spend  working.  In  that case,  another  response  to the wage  rise  might  be  to reduce  the
mother's,  rather than the child's, labor supply,  so that the mother could spend more time
with her child(ren).
There are thus no short cuts. One needs  to recognize that parents attach weight to
their  own  and  to  each  of their  children's  lifetime  consumption  stream.  The  weights
attached  to  each  of these  consumption  streams  and  the  rate  at  which  the  future  is
discounted  may  vary  from  household  to household,  depending  on the  parents'  altruism
and foresight or on their ability to appropriate part of their children's future incomes.
We  define  children's  consumption  to  include  not only food  and clothes  but also
medical  care.  We  exclude  educational  inputs,  which  we  regard  as  an  investment  and
consider as a separate  item.  Strictly speaking,  health  expenditures also  should be treated
as  an  investment.  So  should  nutrition,  because  the  amount  of food  consumed  in  the
pre-school  period  is known to have  a positive effect on the  probability that the child will
survive  to  school  age  and,  more  generally,  on  his  or  her  current  and  future  health
prospects.  As it  is difficult to  separate these  long-term  effects from  the more  immediate
ones,  however,  we  keep  health  expenditure  in  with  current  consumption,  and  look  for
links  between  this and  health/survival  probabilities.  The amount that a person  is  able to
earn,  as  an  adult,  is  positively  related  to  that  person's  health  (dependent  on  past
consumption)  and  personal  skills (dependent  on  human  capital).  Therefore,  saying  that
parents give weight to each of their children's  lifetime consumption  streams is equivalent
to saying that they care about how much their children  consume today and about the size
of the stock of health and human capital that they will carry  into adult life.
Human  capital  is  partly  a  reflection  of  native  talent  and  partly  the  fruit  of
education.  The  second  part  is  "produced"  with  time  (which  includes  not  only  school
attendance  but  also  homework)  and  other  educational  inputs  (books,  tuition  fees,  and
writing materials but also travel to school).  The opportunity cost of the time that the child
spends  being  educated  is  equal  to  the  child's  wage  rate  and/or  the child's  marginal
product in the family farm or business.  Assuming this to be constant,  the marginal cost of
human capital  is constant up to the point where the child's time is fully devoted to
17 Alternatively,  one child's work can become  another child's (his/her younger sibling's) education.
18education.  From that point  onward,  the marginal  cost  rises,  as more and  more  has to be
spent  on educational  inputs,  in combination  with a fixed time endowment,  to provide the
child with an extra unit of human capital.
2.2  Fertility choice and decisions concerning  pre-school  children
Parents decide whether to have an additional  child and how much to spend on the
new  child  until  he  or  she  reaches  school  age  under  conditions  of uncertainty  about
whether  the  child  will  live  to  school  age.  For  any  given  set  of environmental  and
hereditary  conditions,  the  child's  survival  probability  will be  positively  conditioned  by
health-enhancing  public  policies  (sanitation,  mass  immunization,  and  so  on),  which
parents take as given,  but also by the amount that the child  consumes between  birth and
school age,'8 which  is decided by the parents.  Therefore,  a child's chances of living until
he or she  reaches school  age depend not only on external  conditions  but also on actions
taken by the child's  own parents.  It is open  to debate whether,  in choosing  their fertility
behavior  and  allocating  consumption  to their  children,  parents  are  actually  aware  that
their decisions will affect the probability of those children surviving  and take account of
how  their  children's  time  will  be  allocated  between  study  and  work  if they  do  reach
school age. Empirical evidence  9 suggests that parents behave as if they were aware of the
consequences of their actions, and that is all that matters for our purposes.
Combined with random  events,  these parental  decisions  determine  the number  of
births  in the family  and the  consumption  levels of pre-school  children.  Under  plausible
conditions,20 direct  health-enhancing  policies  (such as  public  expenditure  on health  and
sanitation  etc,  or rise  in  the price of the goods  consumed by pre-school  children) would
reduce fertility and raise the consumption  of pre-school  children if public expenditure  is a
net complement  for pre-school  child consumption or raise fertility  and reduce  pre-school
child  consumption  if it  is a net  substitute.  If it  is  a net complement,  fertility and  infant
mortality  move  in  the  same  direction,  which  is  what  the  empirical  evidence  seems  to
suggest.
In  conclusion,  the  household  takes  the  following,  strictly  interrelated  decisions
simultaneously:  how  many  births  to  procure;  the  consumption  level  of  pre-school
children; the consumption,  labor supply, and time and money spent on educating  school-
's  This, remember,  is defined to include medical  care as well as nutrition.
'9 For example, Cigno and Pinal (2001).
20  See Cigno ( 1998).
19age children;  and the consumption  of adult household  members.  Reviewing the different
ways  in  which  child  labor  and  welfare  can  be  influenced  by  changes  in  economic
circumstances  and  policy  actions  will  help  us  to  understand  the  complexity  of the
decision process  as well  as highlight  policy options. We  will  see that important  changes
may be due to events that are not so "close" to the variable(s) of interest.
2.3 Decisions  concerning  school-age children
Parents decide how to allocate the time of their school-age children and how much
to spend  on  each  of them  with  the  aim  of achieving  as  far  as possible  their  objectives
(which,  remember,  include  the  well-being  of the  children),  subject to the  family budget




The first type of solution occurs when the marginal cost of human capital is higher
than the maximum that parents are willing to pay.2'  If this is the case, the child is made
to work  full time.  The second  type of solution  arises when the  marginal  cost of human
capital is  lower than the minimum, below which parents want their children  to study full
time.  If that is the  case, the child  does not work at  all.  In  between  these extremes,  we
have  a third  type  of solution,  where  parents  invest  the  child's  time  and  expend  other
21  This willingness to pay takes into account the likely return to the educational  investment.
20household resources  to the point where the marginal cost of human capital  is equal to the
price that parents are subjectively  willing to pay (the amount of consumption  that they are
willing to give  up,  in order to endow the child with one  more unit of human  capital).  If
this occurs,  the child works and studies at the same time. If parents send their children to
school at all, they also have to bear the educational costs such as tuition fees and the cost
of books.
The  possibilities  are  illustrated  in Figure  1, where the vertical  axis measures the
amount  consumed by a school-age  child,  c, and the horizontal axis the amount of human
capital,  h,  with which he  or she have  upon  entering  adult life.  The broken  line through
points  I and  L  is  the  production  frontier,  representing  all  the  possible  outcomes  of
(efficient)  household  decisions.  Its  slope  is equal to the marginal  cost of human  capital.
The  line  is truncated  at point I to indicate  that parents cannot  push the child's  stock  of
human  capital  below  a  certain  minimum  ("natural  talent").  The  first  type  of solution,
where the child works full time, is represented  by point I. The  second,  where the child's
time is fully occupied  in education,  can  be  at L or at any point  to the  right of it (to the
right of L, parents  spend money  for the child's education  over and above  the  necessary
minimum).  The third  type of solution,  where  the child  works  and attends  school  at the
same  time,  can  be  anywhere  between  I  and  L.  The  choice  depends  on  parental
preferences,  represented  by a  map  of indifference  curves,22 such  as the  convex-to-the-
origin  curve  through  point  T,  as  well  as  on  resource  restrictions  (reflected  in  the
production frontier).  In the  figure, parents choose point T. This is a situation  in which the
child goes  to  school,  thus  ending  up with  more human  capital  than  he or she  was  born
with,  but  also  works,  thus  consuming  more,  given  the  limitations  imposed  by  the
household budget constraint, than if he or she studied full time.
22  Each of these curves  is a locus of points that give parents  the same satisfaction.
21Chapter 3
Child Labor and the Capital Market
We  have  reasoned,  so  far,  as  if education  were  the only  means of transferring
resources from  the present  to the future.  If a capital  market exists,  however,  parents can
buy  assets  in  addition  or  as  an  alternative  to  having  children  and  investing  in  their
education.  These assets may be financial instruments,  such as stocks and bonds,  but in a
developing  country  they  are  more  likely  to be  real  assets,  such  as  land  and  cattle,  or
personal  credit. As it widens the range of possible choices open to parents,  the availability
of these  alternative  vehicles of inter-temporal  reallocation  raises the household's  wealth.
It does  not necessarily  follow,  however,  that  children  will  be  better off.  Irrespective  of
whether parents are  animated by love of their children  or by self-interest,  the availability
of  an  alternative  raises  the  opportunity  costs  of  raising  children  and  implicitly  or
explicitly lending to them.  Whether the net effect of a wealth increase and the substitution
of capital  for  human  capital  is  favorable  or  unfavorable  to children  depends  on  many
factors including the value that parents attach to the resources transferred to their children
(see last chapter).  In what follows, we limit our analysis to the situation  in which  parents
have  a  given  number  of  children23 and  face  the  choice  between  investing  in  their
children's human capital or in other assets.
3.1 The role of the capital market
Let us allow for the possibility that a capital market exists. Suppose that the assets
traded  in such a market earn a fixed return,  represented  by the interest factor r. 24 Parents
can then choose between two different  ways of providing for their children's and/or their
own future:  schooling and asset accumulation.  Suppose,  for the sake of argument, that are
indifferent  between  endowing  their  adult  children  with  tangible  assets or  with  human
23  See Cigno (1993)  for a more general analysis where would-be parents decide on the number of children
to have and Rosati (1996)  for the introduction of differential  risks of human  and non-human  capital
investments.
24  Considering variable  returns would  not change the conclusion,  so long as the return on the  asset did not
fall more rapidly than the return to education.
22capital of the same  market value.25 If the returns offered by the capital  market are higher
than the returns to schooling, then the parents will not send the child to school at all, even
if the marginal  cost of human  capital happens to be no higher than the maximum  that his
or her parents would be willing to pay. The child will then work full time, and the income
generated  by  him  or  her  will  be  used  partly  to  increase  the  household's  current
consumption  and partly to buy assets.  This will make both the parents and the children26
better off than they would otherwise be.
A  more  general  case  is  presented  in  Figure  2.  The  vertical  axis  measures  the
returns  to  education,  h  and  to the  capital  asset,  r.  The  horizontal  axis  measures  time
devoted  to education,  e. Given  that the  return  to education27  declines  as the  amount  of
schooling  increases,  then  a  situation  like  that  described  in  Figure  2  can  occur.  In  the
absence of credit rationing,28 parents  will invest  in the human  capital of their children  up
to the  point where  the  return  to  education  equals  to the  interest  rate,  e*  in  our  figure.
Thereafter,  they  will  invest any additional  resources  in  the capital  market.  Point  C,  for
example, represents a situation where an increase in household  income would increase  the
transfers  that  parents  wish  to make to their children,  but  such  transfers  would  take  the
form  of capital  assets.  In such  a case, child labor would not be affected  by an exogenous
rise  in household  income.  This  goes to  show  that  money  hand-outs  do  not necessarily
reduce  child labor.  Conversely,  if money were  taken  away  from  the  parents,  then  they
would reduce their transfers  to their children.  In doing  so, they would move to a point to
the  left of C. If the reduction  in income were  small,  this would  have no  effect  on child
labor. If the reduction were  large enough, however,  they could end up somewhere  to the
left of point B, where child  labor is higher.
3.2  The consequences of credit rationing.
Low  returns  to  education  are  often  regarded  as  one  of the  main  reasons  for
households  investing little  in their children's schooling.  There are, however,  situations  in
which  child  labor  can  exceed  its  efficient  level  even  if the  returns  to  education  are
25  Suppose,  in other  words,  that parents  do not derive  pleasure  from  the  mere  fact  that  a child  of theirs  is
educated,  irrespective of his or her earning capacity.  Were  it not so, eaming  potential  would underestimate
the demand for education.
26  Provided  that,  like their parents,  they are  indifferent  about the choice  between  education  and  a tangible
asset with the same expected monetary  value.
27  The  return  to  education  is the reciprocal  of the  marginal  cost of education  (the  slope  of the production
frontier) that, as shown in Figure 1, increases with the amount of time spent in education.
28  For a more  detailed discussion of this point, see Rosati (1999)
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relatively high. Indeed,  if returns to education were high enough,  parents might be willing
to invest  in the human capital of their children as a way of increasing  the welfare of the
family as a whole, not just that of the children themselves.
Consider  the  following  scenario.  In  the  relevant  range,  returns  to education  are
higher  than  the  interest  rate.  If parents  could  borrow  against  their  children's  future
incomes,  they would then be willing to invest more in their education.  As this is generally
not  possible,  however,  parents  will  stop  short  of the  efficient  level  of human  capital
investment,  in other  words, the  level which equals  the (marginal) returns to education to
the interest factor. Figure 3 helps to clarify the point.
The curve through points A and B gives us another view of the production frontier.
The  vertical  axis  now  measures  the  child's  future  income,  Yk,  (which  may  or may  not
coincide with his or her human capital). The horizontal axis measures the parents'  current
consumption,  Cp. The frontier  shows how the  parents'  current consumption  is reduced  if
the child's future  income  is increased because  the parents invest in the child's education
(thus  reducing  the  child's work).  The  frontier's  concavity  implies  decreasing  returns to
education.  In the  absence  of a  capital  market  or if the  household  were  credit-rationed,
parents  would choose  point A.29 At that point,  the  amount  of current  consumption  that
parents are willing to give up in order to increase the child's future income  is equal to the
29  The convex-to-the-origin  curve,  Ul,  is the locus of points that  gives parents the  same satisfaction  as point
A.
24return to  education.  If they  were  allowed  to borrow  from  the  capital  market,  however,





Point C is obviously better than A because both Cp and Yk  are higher. At that point,
the returns to education and returns  to capital are equalized:  that is the efficient outcome.
At A, parents  are  under-investing  in their children's  education.  The  inability  to borrow
against  the  child's  future  income,  however,  makes  it  impossible  to  move  from  the
inefficient equilibrium  at A to the efficient one at C. Therefore,  since households may be
rationed  in the credit market, high returns to education may not be sufficient to guarantee
a reduction of child labor.
What  kinds  of policy  measures  might  then  help  the  economy  away  from  the
inefficient  equilibrium  and  thus  help  to reduce  child  labor?  Two  broad  categories  of
policy  are  of  particular  interest:  policies  that  prompt  intergenerational  transfers  of
resources and policies that aim to allow the younger generation  to "borrow"  against their
own  future  income.  The  main example  of the  first kind of policy  is social  security.  The
introduction,  or extension,  of a pay-as-you-go  social security system  represents a transfer
from  the young to the older generation.  Such a transfer (not feasible through the market)
30 This point is also made by Ranjan (1999,  2001),
25could help to bring the economy closer  to the efficient level of human capital investment,
thereby reducing the supply of child work.
An example of the second type of policy is a government  loan guarantee  program.
Since  capital  market  imperfections  and  moral  hazard  problems  limit  the  possibility  of
borrowing  against  future  earnings,  income-contingent  loans  are  increasingly  used,  or
being proposed,  in developed countries as a way of financing tertiary education.31  Some
suggest  governments  or international  agencies  could  help  to establish  a  market  where
children,  or their parents, could borrow against their future education-enhanced  earnings.
Governments  of developing  countries  may wish to explore  the  idea of extending
such  measures  to  lower  levels  of  education.  Although  these  policies  may  not  be
applicable  to  primary education,  it may be feasible to introduce  such a  loan scheme  for
secondary  education.  In  developing  countries,  where  only  a  very  small  minority  of
students reach  university,  secondary education  is indeed a major gateway to a rewarding
career.  In  view  of evidence  that  parents'  decisions  to  send  their  children  to  primary
schools  are  positively  affected  by the  presence  of a  nearby  secondary  school,  a  loan
scheme for secondary education may also increase participation  in primary education.32
3.3 Differences among siblings
Until now, we have assumed that all children belonging  to the same household are
identical  and that parents show  equal concern  for all of them. If that is the case, parents
who are not credit-constrained  will invest in the education of each child until the rate of
return to  education  equals the return to capital  investment.  While  continuing  to assume
that  parents  are  equally  concerned  about  each  of their  children,  we  will  now  briefly
discuss  the  consequences  for  child  labor  and  education  of innate  differences  among
siblings.
If  children  belonging  to  the  same  family  have  different  expected  returns  to
education,  it is efficient from  the household's  point of view to invest  differently  in their
education.  The  children  whose  returns  from  education  are  expected  to  be  higher  will,
therefore,  study more and  work less than their siblings for whom the parents  have lower
expectations.  Such a behavior does not necessarily imply,  however, that the children who
are  working  today will necessarily  fare  worse  tomorrow  than their  siblings who  attend
school.  The  household  can  compensate  for differences  in earnings  due  to differences  in
31  Baland and Robinson  (2000)
26education  by means of wealth transfers  (inter-vivos gifts,  or bequests) calculated  to  iron
out income differences among siblings.33
For that to be the case, however,  the household  must have sufficient resources,  and
parents  must  be  sufficiently  concerned  about  the  welfare  of their  children  to  invest
efficiently and  then use transfers to redistribute  resources  among them.  If this  is not  the
case,  then  the  future  welfare  of children  is clearly  not  independent  of the  amount  of
schooling  that they  get.  Relatively  poor  credit-constrained  households  do  not  have  the
means  to  finance  the  education  of  their  children  up  to  the  efficient  point  and  to
compensate  them  for any  eamings  differentials.  In  poor households,  therefore,  children
who are working today are more likely to be worse off tomorrow than their siblings who
attend school. Moreover,  working children will have lower expected retums to education,
either  because  of an  innate  lack  of  ability  or  because  of  unfavorable  labor  market
conditions.34
This  mechanism  can  explain  large  gender  differences  even  in  the  absence  of
gender biases in the parent's preferences.  If returns to education  are expected to be lower
for  girls,  girls  are more  likely than boys to work  (inside, or outside  the  household).  If
more  girls  than  boys  work,  many  women enter adult  life with  lower  human  capital  than
that of men, and  fewer of them  will eam a good  wage or work for a wage at all,  thereby
confirming  the  expectation  that education  for women  is a  bad  investment.35 Moreover,
girls coming from poor families are even more likely to have a low level of income when
adults because of lower compensatory  transfers  from their parents.
The general  considerations  examined in this and the  preceding chapter  provide us
with  a framework within which to examine  the effects of various policies and household
characteristics on child labor and child welfare.
32  Lavy (1996) and Cigno,  Rosati, and Tzannatos (2000)
33  See  Becker and Tomes (1976).
34 See  Behrman (1997).
35 See  Cigno (1991).
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Household  Income
With this chapter, we start to examine the empirical evidence regarding the effects
of various factors, beginning with household income,  likely to affect the decision to make
a child  to work  and  other  aspects  of a child's  welfare.  As  we  will  see,  income  is  an
important consideration,  but things are more complicated than one might think.
4.1 Effects on child labor and  education
If investment  in  the  human  capital  of the  children  represents  the  only  way  of
transferring  resources  to the future,  an exogenous  increase  in current  income will  reduce
child  labor,  as the  household  will  have more  resources  available  for consumption  today
and  human  capital  investment  will  make  it  possible  to  increase  the  child's  future
consumption.  In  practice,  this  implies  that  higher  income  is  associated  with  a  lower
probability that a child will work  full time and a higher probability that a child will study
full time. The  probability that a child will both work and attend school can either increase
or  decrease  depending  on  how his  or her  time  was allocated  initially.  We  have  seen,
however,  that  if  the  capital  market  offers  attractive  alternatives  to  human  capital
investment,  an increase  in income will make no difference to child labor.
If it is  not  true  that  the  only  way  to  transfer  resources  to  children  for  future
consumption  is  through  human  capital  investment,  parents  will  invest  in  the  human
capital  of their  offspring only  to the point  where  the  return  to education  is equal  to the
return  to  capital.  Beyond  that  point,  households  will  make  any  further  transfer  of
resources  from  current  to  future  consumption  through  the  capital  market.  In  this  more
realistic  scenario,  the  link  between  children's  labor  supply and income  becomes  looser,
especially  in the  case  of richer  households.  This  implies  that the  relationship  between
household  income  and child  labor supply is likely to be non-linear,  with  larger elasticity
at lower levels of income and lower elasticity at higher ones.
Child labor is often and rightly associated with poverty. Tables  10 A to E illustrate
the point by showing the distribution of children by work status and household income  in
28the NCAER survey of rural India and in the LSMS surveys of Vietnam and Morocco.  It is
clear from these tables that children belonging to households with higher incomes are less
likely  to  work,  whether  full  or  part  time  (and  are  less  likely  to  be  reported  as  doing
nothing).  However,  the  effects of household  income  on child  labor are  very difficult  to
measure correctly and are often overestimated.
Obviously,  we  cannot  use  the  income  generated  by  child  labor  to explain  child
labor as most children  do not work for a wage  but in the family farm  or business.  Thus,
estimating the contribution of these  children to the output of the family  business  is  very
difficult.  Therefore,  we  must  measure  household  income  net  of children's  earnings  or
productivity,  which  is also  not easy to do.  Later,  we  shall describe the attempts  that we
made  in  a number  of studies.  Even  more difficult  is  the  task of assigning  a  monetary
value to household chores  performed  by children.  Note that what should be calculated  is
not  how  much  the  household  would  have  to  pay  a  domestic  servant  for  the  services
provided by children (which are usually excluded from the definition of income anyway),
but the labor market value of the adult time freed due to the household  chores perfonned
by  the  children.  Correctly  estimating  the  effect  of income  on  child  labor,  therefore,
requires special statistical techniques.36
TABLE  1OA: WORK/STUDY  STATUS OF CHILDREN BY INCOME QUINTILE  IN INDIA,  1994
INCOME  1  2  3  4  5
Work Only  12.2  10.1  7.1  6.0  4.6
Neither Work nor Study  29.9  22  18.0  16.9  13.0
Study Only  53.6  63.7  70.9  72.4  78.5
Work and Study  4.2  4.0  3.9  4.5  3.7
TABLE 1OB:  CHILD LABOR  FORCE PARTICIPATION AND  ENROLLMENT  RATES BY
EXPENDITURE  QUINTILE  IN VIETNAM  (1993)
Expenditure quintile  Lowest  _  2 - 3  - 4  5
School and work  27.8  26.6  26.0  21.0  12.6
School only  51.5  56.3  58.6  63.3  77.3
Work only  16.3  14.3  11.8  13.5  7.6
Neither school nor work  4.3  2.8  3.6  2.2  2.5
36  See  Rosati  and Tzannatos (2000),  Bhalotra (2000), and references  therein.
29TABLE 1OC: CHILD LABOR PARTICIPATION AND ENROLLMENT RATES BY
EXPENDITURE  QUINTILE IN VIETNAM (1998)
Expenditure quintile  Lowest  2  3  4  5
School and work  20.7  22.7  18.9  14.7  8.0
School  only  66.2  67.8  72.6  78.5  88.3
Work only  10.2  6.8  6.9  4.5  1.5
Neither school nor work  2.5  2.6  1.6  2.3  2.2
TABLE 1OD:  CHILD LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATES
BY EXPENDITURE  QUINTILE IN  MOROCCO (1991)
1  1  2  1  3  4  5
School  only  40.2  49.1  51.6  69.7  80.1
Work only  21.1  21.8  17.7  14.3  10.1
Neither school nor work  38.5  28.7  30.3  15.7  9.6
TABLE  1OE: CHILD LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION  AND  SCHOOL ENROLMENT RATES
BY EXPENDITURE  QUINTILE IN MOROCCO (1998)
1  2  3  4  5
School  only  44.2  57.5  66.2  76.6  85.3
Work only  20.1  16.7  14.1  10.6  6.8
Neither  school nor work  34.3  25.5  18.8  11.6  7.1
In many empirical  studies,  by contrast,  income or other measures of the resources
available  to the household  are  used  as explanatory  variables  of child labor.  The  income
variables  are  not  always  significant  in  the  statistical  sense.  Where  significant,  their
estimated  effect  on  child  labor  is usually  negative.  In  a series  of studies  carried  out in
India,  Morocco,  and  Vietnam,  we  found  that  household  income  or  expenditure  has  a
significantly  negative  effect  on child  labor but that the relationship  is highly non-linear.
The  negative  effect of household  income  on child  labor  supply tends to be smaller,  the
higher the level  of income.  In Vietnam, for example, we find that the effect of household
income on child labor  in households  in the lowest income  quintile  is 10 times larger than
for  households  belonging  to  the  highest  income  quintile.3  While  consistent  with  the
theory, this is seldom discussed  in empirical studies.
4.2 Effects on nutrition and health care
37 Edmonds (2001)  also finds a highly non-linear relationship between household income and child labor.
30We  have  already  discussed  the  problems  involved  in  measuring  health  status.
While  attention  has  been  given  in  the  literature  to  the  determinants  of the  health  of
children  (as  measured  by  different  indicators  of mortality  or  morbidity),  there  is  little
evidence  on the relationship  between child  labor and child  health.  In their study of rural
India,  Cigno,  Rosati,  and  Tzannatos  (2000)  detect  a positive  association  between  body
mass and child  labor.  To  some extent,  this  may be  due to the fact that stronger  children
are  sent to work.  Assuming,  however,  that work uses more calories  than studying  does,
the  finding  still  implies  that working  children  are  fed better than non-working  ones.  To
our knowledge,  no other study has dealt with this problem,  and the question needs further
investigation.  Unfortunately,  however,  many household  surveys  do not report composite
health  indicators,  like weight and height,  so do not provide the information  necessary  for
analyzing  the relationship  between  child  labor  and  health.  As pointed  out  in  Chapter  1,
this kind of information  should  be gathered  for a number of different  reasons,  and  it  is
important that any measuring should be done by or in the presence of the interviewer.
Both the  study on rural India and the  numerous studies that have concentrated  on
child health  show  a positive  association  between household  income and the health  status
of children.  There  is  some  evidence  that  stock  measures  of child  health  (for  example,
height)  are  positively  affected  by  measures  of  long-term  resources  (for  example,
permanent  income  or  wealth  rather  than  current  income).  While  these  effects  are
statistically  significant,  their magnitudes are typically fairly small.  Shorter-term  measures
of income  have  an  even  weaker  impact  on  the  child's  stock  of health.  By  contrast,
shorter-term  measures  of health  (for example,  weight  given  height) are  more responsive
to  current  income  but  not  to  permanent  income.  However,  these  findings  are  far  from
universal.  The  fact  that  there  are  mixed  empirical  results  regarding  the  effects  of
resources  on  health  outcomes  should  not  come  as  a  surprise  given  the  difficulty  of
measurement.
4.3 Income redistribution
The elasticity of child labor supply to household  resources is relatively  small. For
example,  an  increase  in  income  in the range  of 10  to 20 percent  tends  to have  a  small
effect  on child labor supply. We have just seen that health also appears to react weakly to
a  change  in household  resources.  This  is somehow  in contrast  with evidence  that  child
labor supply is substantially smaller in those households that belong in the higher income
31quintiles and that individuals  who belong to richer households enjoy better health.  While
low  income seems to be associated with relatively  higher  child  labor supply,  changes  in
income do not seem to generate large reductions in the child  labor supply. How are we to
explain  this  apparent  paradox,  that  poverty  is  associated  with  child  labor  and  school
attendance,  but income subsidies are likely to produce only relatively small effects?
Part  of the  answer  is  that  income  differences  are  very  large  in  developing
countries.  The income of the poor can be many times smaller than that of the not-so-poor.
Hence,  even  relatively  large changes  in  income are not  sufficient to modify the position
of the  poor  substantially.  This  implies  that  very  large  transfers  would  be  required  to
significantly  alter  the  situation.  However,  transfers  of  such  a  magnitude  are  not
economically  or politically  feasible.  It also implies that income  growth can be seen  as a
"6cure"  for child  labor only  in  the medium  to  long term.  Hence,  income  re-distribution
and  growth  appear  to  be poor  policies  for  promoting  human  capital  accumulation  and
bringing to an end the more damaging forms of child labor.
We find that, taking the level of income as given, there  is a large set of variables,
including the availability of school and health facilities, that influences parental decisions
about  child  labor.  It  is,  therefore,  possible  to change  these  decisions  and  to  influence
children's  welfare  without  recourse  to  large-scale  income  re-distribution.  Obviously,
other forms of policy also imply some degree of re-distribution.  They can be preferable  to
straightforward  income  re-distribution,  if  they  are  more  indirect  and,  therefore,  less
visible. Furthermore,  they can be partially financed,  in the medium term, by the additional
growth  that  they  themselves  generate.  While  large-scale  income  re-distribution  (for
example,  through sharply progressive  income taxation) has efficiency costs,  under certain
conditions  state  provision  of school  and  health  facilities  will enhance  productivity  and,
thus,  growth.  Last  but  not  least,  providing  facilities  to all,  even  if not  everybody  uses
them,  may be politically  more acceptable  than income re-distribution.
On  this issue,  Swinnerton  and  Rogers (1999)  provide an extention  of Basu's and
Van's analysis and develop  the theoretical  result that for countries that are rich enough to
have  a "good"  equilibrium,  redistribution  can  in theory  eliminate child  labor.  However,
redistribution  in  very poor  countries,  even  if it could be carried  on  in a nondistortionary
way, could increase child labor.  The reason  is that if a country is sufficiently  poor, then
spreading  out  a  small  "pie"  more  equally  will  push  more  families  below  the  poverty
threshold at which they begin to send children  to the labor market.  Some empirical work
32supports this conclusion (by showing that for countries below some  critical level of GDP
the marginal  effect on child  labor of increasing  inequality is negative  while for countries
above that threshold it  is positive).  This  is another reason why redistribution  may  be an
ineffective  policy for reducing child labor.
33Chapter 5
Children's Education
The  availability,  cost  and  returns  to  education  constitute  another  important
category  of  factors  likely  to  affect  decisions  regarding  the  allocation  of household
resources,  including  the  time  of  children.  We  shall  see  that  it  affects  child  work,
schooling and nutrition. In a very indirect way, it also affects fertility.
5.1 Direct returns to education
Expected  returns  to  investment  in  human  capital38 are  a crucial  determinant  of
household  decisions  concerning  child  labor.  Unfortunately,  however,  it  is  extremely
difficult to measure returns to education.  The most commonly  used procedure  for doing
so by estimating  a simple relationship  between  earnings  and  years of education,  the  so-
called Mincerian  equation,39 is subject to many limitations.40 Where developing countries
in  general  and  rural  communities  in  particular  are  concerned,  there  is  an  additional
problem.  Returns  to education  may be very  different  for the minority of the labor  force
that works for a formal  wage than for those who belong to a rural  household  or who are
self-employed.  For  all  these  reasons,  measuring  the  returns  to  education  in  farming,
particularly on family farms,  is very difficult.4 '
Using estimated  returns to  education to explain  children's  time allocation is  even
more  problematic.  One should measure  not only the average  expected return  in each type
of employment  but also what kind of employment the household  expects  the child to be
able to find. For these reasons, (expected)  returns to education are usually omitted in child
work  estimates.  Even  if not  included  in  the  estimated  equations,  however,  returns  to
education  offer useful  insights.  For example,  in the case of Vietnam, the part of the  1992-
38  For a global overview, see Psacharopoulos  (1994).
39 The idea goes back  to Becker (1964), but the implementation  is in Mincer (1974).
40 It is beyond the  scope of this Handbook to discuss in detail  issues concerning  the estimation  of returns to
education.  The reader  should  be warned,  however,  that results  based  on OLS  estimates  might  be  biased.
Thus, it may be necessary to correct for selection bias and to use  Instrumental  Variable methods.
41 A  discussion of these  problems and  an  attempt to estimate  returns to education  in  the farming  sector of
Vietnam can be found  in Rosati and  Tzannatos (2000).
341998  reduction  in  child  labor  that cannot  be  explained  by  the  other  variables  can  be
attributed to the increase  in returns to education that occurred  during this period.
5.2  Indirect returns to education
Investing in the children's future incomes,  in other words,  sending them to school
rather than to work,  has  important implications  for fertility  and  infant  mortality.  In  their
study  of  rural  India,  Cigno,  Rosati,  and  Tzannatos  (2000)  find  that,  the  higher  the
probability that a child will work when of school age, the higher the probability that his or
her  parents  will  have an  additional  birth.  This positive  and  statistically  very  significant
connection between fertility and probability of work suggests that parents may be looking
for an extra source of income,  or for an extra pair of arms, rather than for the sheer joy of
parenthood.  It thus reinforces  the point made at the beginning of Chapter 2, that parental
decisions are a compromise  between different objectives.
There  is,  on  the  other  hand,  a  well-established  positive  correlation  between
fertility  and  infant mortality:  children  born  in high-fertility  households  or  high-fertility
countries42 are  less  likely to  survive  to  school age  and  then to adulthood.  Although the
probability  of survival  was  not  directly  measured  in  the  India  study  to  which  we  are
referring,  such  a  relationship  is  consistent  with  its  findings.  Since  lower  fertility  is
associated,  in  the  same  study,  with  a  higher  probability  of attending  school  and  with
higher  educational  expenditure  if the  child  does  go  to  school,  this  implies  a  negative
association  between  fertility and  human  capital  investment and between  infant  mortality
and  human  capital  investment.  This  is  consistent  with  the  finding of Rosenzweig  and
Schultz (1982) that expected employment opportunities  for women have a positive impact
on the survival  chances of female children.
The explanation can be traced back to the theoretical  discussion in Chapters 2 and
3.43  The variables  (prices,  wages,  productivity,  and  so on) that condition  the decision  to
send a child  to work rather than to school  are by -and large the same ones that make  it
cheaper  for a couple to achieve the optimum family size by giving birth to many children
but  investing  little in the survival  of each  child that is  born  rather than  giving  birth to
fewer children  but doing more to help each one survive.  Although  it may be misleading
42  See,  for example,  Chowdhury  (1988).  On the  other  hand,  high  child  mortality  rates  may  induce  high
fertility  rates (the  "replacement"  argument)  though  this  effect  is  far from  certain (Tzannatos  and  Symons,
1989).
43  See also Cigno (1998)  and Cigno  and Pinal (2001).
35to  talk of lower  fertility and  lower  infant mortality  under  the heading  of returns (albeit
indirect  ones)  to  education,  it  is  nevertheless  worth  noting  that  policies  aimed  at
encouraging  schooling,  or  discouraging  child  labor,  have  the  desirable  side-effect  of
encouraging  responsible parenthood  and alleviating  infant mortality  (in particular among
girls).
5.3 Costs and  quality of education
5.3.1  Schoolfees and educational  material
Education  can have both direct and indirect costs.  The direct costs include  school
fees,  uniforms,  required  school  materials,  and  so on. The  indirect  costs  are  represented
mainly  by the opportunity  cost  of time  and  by the  cost of transportation  to the  nearest
school.  It  is  important  to  distinguish  between  the  (exogenous)  costs  of education  and
(endogenous)  expenditures  on education.  The  (exogenous)  costs  basically  represent  the
price  for education.  The (endogenous)  expenditures are  determined,  together with all  the
other choices,  by the household.  How a rise  in the price of education affects the decision
to  send  children  to work or to  school  is not  as obvious  as  one  might think.  Since  both
fertility and child labor are endogenous  (in other words,  the result of household choices),
the effect  of a change  in the price of education on child  labor supply depends  also on the
effect this  has on fertility.  When  the price of schooling  increases,  the cost of having an
extra child  increases too. The optimal mix between the number (quantity) of children and
the  level  of welfare  (quality of life) that  a household  can offer to each  child depends  on
the relative  marginal costs of the quality and  quantity of children.  These relative marginal
costs  depend,  among  other  things,  on  how  much  the household  already  spends  on  the
current consumption  and education of each child. Hence,  the net effect of a change in the
price of schooling on child  labor  supply depends not only on how fertility  decisions  are
affected  by  this price but also on the existing  level of educational  expenditure  (which, in
turn,  depends  on  the  starting  levels  of all  the  other  variables,  including  the  price  of
education).  Thus,  for  example,  a reduction  in  the price  of education  may  increase  child
labor if there is a large (positive) response in fertility.
For any given  number of children,  a decrease  in the direct cost  of education  will
reduce the price of the future consumption of children, and will thus increase  schooling at
the expense of child labor. However,  as education costs decrease,  the unit cost of children
36also  decreases,  while the  desired  number of children  increases.  As this  increase  in the
number  of children  will  put  pressure  on  resources,  parents  may  then  transform  some
future consumption  into current consumption by raising the labor supply of their children.
There  is another interesting  policy issue here.  When  average school  attendance  is
very low,  the cost of each child  is likely to be  low (the  cost of each child is given  by the
child's consumption,  plus the expenditure  for education net of any contribution made by
the  child to  household  income).  An  increase  in. schooling  costs,  in such  a  situation,  is
likely  to  be  associated  in  the  medium  run,  with  an  increase  in  fertility.  When  school
attendance  is (relatively)  high,  cost sharing  might promote  higher investments  in  human
capital  and  contribute  to  fertility  decline.  An  increase  in  education  costs  might  then
reduce  fertility  and  favor a  further  increase  of schooling.  In  short,  in  countries  where
school attendance  is very low, policy intervention  should  be aimed at reducing the cost of
schooling to encourage school enrolment.  In countries where school attendance  is already
relatively high, the introduction of a limited  subsidy might promote  higher investment by
families  in  human  capital  and  favor  fertility  decline.  This  effect  would  be  stronger  if
revenues from cost sharing were used to increase school quality and, therefore, the returns
to human capital.
The  available  empirical  evidence  seems  to  confirm  the  implications  of  the
preceding  discussion.  In Vietnam,  where  school attendance  is relatively high, tuition fees
appear  to  reduce the  probability  of  children  working  (Rosati  and  Tzannatos,  2000).
Similar results have been observed  in Colombia  and Peru  (Ilahi,  1999).  In Morocco,  on
the other  hand, tuition  costs have  a negative  effect on  school  attendance  (Rosati,  2000).
As  the  enrollment  rate  in  Morocco  is  low  in  comparison  with  the  other  countries
mentioned,  this  finding  is  consistent  with  the  theoretical  argument.  It  should  be
remembered,  however,  that higher tuition costs might also be an indicator that the school
is of a high quality.  Hence,  a positive  effect of these  costs  on  school attendance  might
also be interpreted as the effect of perceived quality on household schooling decisions.
5.3.2  School availability, distance  from school, and  school grades
The  availability  of  schools  and  how  far  they  are  located  from  household's
residence  enter  into  the  determination  of the  indirect  cost of education.  Since,  as  it  is
often  argued,  returns  to  primary  education  are  generally  low,  parents  might  be  more
willing to  send their  children  to  primary  school  if they know  that there  is  a secondary
:37school  in  the  area.  Hence,  school  availability  might  also  be  a  proxy  for the  return to
education.  Since  school  accessibility  is  an important  policy  issue per se,  however,  we
shall keep this discussion separate from that of the direct costs of education.
In India, Morocco  and Vietnam, school availability significantly affects household
decisions  about  child  labor.  In  India,  the  probability  that  a  child  will  study  full  time
increases with the presence of a school in the village and with the grade of education  that
the  school  offers  (Cigno,  Rosati,  and  Tzannatos,  2000).  The  fact  that  having  a
higher-grade  school in the village raises the probability of a child attending not only that
grade  of school but also the lower  grades confirms that school availability  does influence
household  decisions  via  the  expected  returns  to  education.44  In  Vietnam,  school
availability  increases  the probability  of a child attending school and working, relative  to
the chance of attending  school without working but does not affect the chance that he or
she will only work  (Rosati and Tzannatos,  2000). Distance,  by contrast,  does not  have a
significant  effect  on  the  decision  to  let  a  child  attend  school.  In  Morocco,  school
availability  has a  strongly  positive  influence  on the  school  enrollment  of rural  children
(Rosati, 2000).
These  effects  are  all  in  the  expected  direction  but  differ  qualitatively  and
quantitatively  from country to country. In Vietnam,  school availability reduces child labor
only marginally.  It seems  mainly to make it easier  for children to attend school and work
at the  same time. In  the other two countries,  by contrast,  school availability  does reduce
the  probability  that  a  child will  work  and  increases  the probability  that  he or  she will
attend  school  full  time.  In  India,  for  example,  a  simulation  has  shown  that  putting  a
secondary  school  in  every  village would  increase  the  probability  that a  child will  study
full time  by about three percentage  points and would  reduce the probability that  a child
will work and attend school at the same time by the same amount. These effects appear to
be even stronger  in Morocco,  where providing every village with a primary school would
increase the enrollment rate by more than six percentage points.
It is obviously very difficult to compare  results in such different  economies. What
is  clear,  however,  is  that  the  effectiveness  of  various  policies  depends  on  the
characteristics of the economy in question. In general, we can say that, as predicted by the
44  To verify  the validity of this inference,  Cigno, Rosati,  and Tzannatos  (2000) re-estimated  the  model  for
children aged  6 to  15  using two  separate  dummies,  one for the  presence  of a primary  school and  the  other
for the presence  of a higher-level  school.  Since the coefficients  of both these  dummies  have  positive  sign,
the interpretation seems legitimate.
38theory,  in  countries  where  school  attendance  (investment  in  the  quality  of children)  is
relatively high,  proximity to a school may favor the combination of schooling with work.
On the other hand,  in countries where school enrollment  is relatively  low, proximity to a
school will reduce child labor and favor fulltime education.
5.3.3 School quality
There  are good a priori  reasons  to expect that the quality of the school mattersin
the  household's  decision  about  how  best  to  use  children's  time.  Indeed,  the effect  of
school  quality can be rationalized within our interpretative  framework  in terms of the cost
of education  or,  equivalently,  of returns to education.  Higher school quality  implies that
the same level of human capital can be accumulated  in less time, thus reducing the overall
cost of education. Alternatively,  for a given amount of time spent at school, higher school
quality creates more human capital, thus increasing the returns to time spent  in education.
It is not obvious, however,  how school quality should be measured,  and  few labor
force surveys have even attempted  to collect this kind of information.  In addition,  there is
an  endogeneity  problem  since  people  with  more  education  may  have  attended  better
quality schools.  It is important, therefore,  to treat school choice as endogenous.
There  is  hardly  any  evidence  on  the  relationship  between  school  quality,  school
attendance,  and  child  labor.45 Some  information  on this matter comes  from studies  that
analyze  the  determinants  of wages.  These  studies  show that  school  quality,  particularly
teacher/pupil  ratios, is positively associated with returns to education. This seems to point
towards  an  intensive  investment  in  schooling,  but not enough  information  has yet been
gathered on this issue.
45  Exceptions are  Schultz  (1997) and Dreze and Kingdom  (2000).
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Household  Structure
A  household's  demographic  composition  is  an  important  determinant  of  its
decisions about  children's  school  enrollment  and  work.  The way  in  which this  variable
influences  these  decisions  is  a combination  of substitution  and  income  effects.  In  this
chapter,  we  examine  these  effects  in each  of the  three countries  - India,  Morocco,  and
Vietnam,  for which we have first-hand  information. For the reasons  indicated  in Chapter
2, it seems reasonable to categorize household members into three groups: adults, school-
age children,  and pre-school children.
6.1 India
For rural  India, Cigno,  Rosati,  and Tzannatos (2000) find that an increase  in total
household  size reduces the probability that a school-age child  will work at all and makes
it more  likely that the work will be part-time.  With the number of children (up to the age
of 16) controlled  for, this is the same as saying that the number of adults in the household
reduces the probability  of a child working.  This is a labor productivity effect:  the greater
the  number of adults  working  on  a  given  piece  of land,  the  lower the  return  to  getting
another child to work on it.
The  number  of pre-school  children raises  the probability  that a  school-age  child
will  "work  only"  relative  to the probability  that  the  child will  "study  only"  but  has  no
significant effect  on  the probability  that he  or she  will  both "work and  study."46 Given
that pre-school  children are too young to work and that an increase  in their number is thus
equivalent  to  a  lump-sum  reduction  in  full  income  (an  income-dilution  effect),  this
finding  is  consistent  with  the  theoretical  prediction  that  a  lump-sum  increase  in  full
income raises the probability  of full-time work,  lowers that of full-time study,  and has an
ambiguous effect on that of part-time work.
46  Patrinos and Psacharopooulos  (1997) find the same in Peru.
40The  number of school-age  children  increases  the  probability  that a child  in that
same age range  will "work only" or "work and study," but the effect on the probability of
"work only"  is not as large as that of the number of pre-school  children.
6.2 Vietnam
For Vietnam, Rosati and Tzannatos  (2000) report that an increase  in the number of
adults  in the household reduces  the probability that a school-age  child will work. As both
income  and land size were held constant, this is most likely to be the result of the decline
in the labor  productivity on children  labor  supply. On the other hand,  an increase  in the
number of siblings,  both  of pre-school  and  school  age,  increases  the  probability that  a
child will have to work. This could be either an income effect (as expenditures  might not
capture all of the  income effects)  or a productivity effect (if there are  fewer adults in the
household,  the  marginal  productivity  of  child  labor  increases  in  the  majority  of
households that are self-employed).
6.3 Morocco
For  Morocco,  Rosati  (2000)  finds  that  family  structure  influences  decisions
differently  depending  on  where  the  household  is  located.  In  urban  areas,  where  most
people are not farmers, the effects associated  with household  composition are most likely
to  be  income  effects.  In  households  that  contain  large  numbers  of pre-school  children
(and  holding  total  household  size  constant),  girls  are  less  likely  to attend  school  than
boys, while the probability  that they will work or perform household  chores is higher. For
boys, the number of school age siblings  raises the probability that they will have to work,
while  it  does  not  modify  the  probability  that they  will  be  "idle"  (see  Chapter  1).  As
school-age  children  have  a  lower  earning  capacity  than  adults,  it  is  likely  that,  in
households  where relatively more school age children are present,  some of these children
might  be  sent  to work  (remember  that we  are  holding  the total  number  of household
members  constant).  The different effects of household  structure on boys and girls reflect,
most likely, gender specialization  within the household.
In  rural  areas,  where  most  people  are  farmers,  the  effects  of  household
composition  are linked to the returns to work in the agricultural  sector. For a given  level
of fixed factors (land and capital), the productivity  of child labor decreases as the number
of adults present  in the household  increases.  This  is reflected  in the negative  effect that
this  variable  has  on the probability  of working  or being  "idle."  On  the  other hand,  the
41number  of siblings  tends to  reduce  the probability  of a child  attending  school.  Gender
differences  are  also strong.  The  presence  of siblings  increases  the  probability  that male
children will be sent to work, while it does not affect their chances of being idle. For girls,
who are more likely than boys to be involved in household chores, the number of siblings
makes  both  "working  only"  and  "neither  going  to  school  or  working"  more  likely.
Moreover,  for girls, the presence  of younger siblings has a greater effect than the presence
of school-age  siblings. This is  due to the mother-substitute  role often assigned to girls in
households'  division of labor.
42Chapter 7
Parents' Education
Among the factors affecting parental decisions  is also the level of education of the
parents.  Since that is,  in turn,  the result of decisions taken by the parents'  own parents,  it
is clear that the consequences of education decisions extend beyond the direct beneficiary
of that decision.
7.1 Effects on schooling and child labor
In general,  children of better educated  parents are more likely to attend school and
less likely to work  part or full  time than  the children of less  educated  parents.  It  is not
wise to attribute  these  effects  to  preference-shaping  selection  (in other  words,  all  other
things  being equal,  more  educated  parents  are  likely  to  have  a  greater  inclination  for
education),  or information.  With  household  income controlled  for, the effect of parents'
education  should  not capture  income  effects.  However,  as the variables  used to measure
income  are subject to measurement  error,  it is still possible that some of what appears to
be  the  effect  of parents'  education  is  actually  the  effect  of income.  Here  too,  the  data
show substantial  differences between countries but also some common patterns.
In rural India,  the mother's  level of education  appears to have an influence  on the
parents'  decision  to make a  child work  or study (Cigno,  Rosati,  and  Tzannatos,  2000).
Children  whose  mothers have  less than a primary  education  are more likely to work  full
time and less likely to study full time than other children.  Children whose mothers have
more than a primary education  are less  likely to work and study  and more likely to study
full time than other children.  By contrast,  the father's education does not appear to have a
significant influence.
In Vietnam,  children  with more educated parents are less  likely to work full time
than other children (Rosati and Tzannatos,  2000).
In Morocco,  the effect of parents'  education  depends  on where  the  family  lives
(Rosati,  2000).  In urban  areas,  the  number of years of formal  education  received  by the
father reduces the probability that his sons will "work only" or "work and study"  and that
43his daughters  will "work  only" or "neither  work nor study" (see  Chapter  1 again).  The
mother's  education  does  not  appear  to  have  any  significant  effect.  In  rural  areas,  the
father's  years of formal  education  increase  the probability  that his children  will  attend
school.  The  mother's  formal  education  has  no  significant  effect.  However,  parents'
religious education  has a significantly  negative  effect on the probability of girls  working
or performing household  chores. Religious education  appears, therefore, to benefit girls in
the  household.  In  a  country  where  the  gender  issue  is  so  relevant  for child  labor,  this
finding has interesting policy  implications.
A possible explanation  of these  findings  is that education  confers  greater weight
(moral  authority or, if education  translates  into income,  bargaining  power) on the mother
in  family  decisions.  If,  as  some  assume,  mothers  spend  more  time  caring  for  their
children  than  fathers  do,  the  mother's  education  tends to  have  a  positive  effect  on  the
welfare  of her children  (Folbre,  1986  and Eswaran,  2001). Given  the  trade-off between
education  and  current  consumption  (see Chapter  2),  however,  this does  not necessarily
mean  that children  of more  educated  mothers  are  more  likely  to go to school.  Indeed,
depending  on circumstances,  caring  mothers  might insist on their children working,  and
on  using  the  additional  income  to  improve  their  children's  nutrition  rather  than  on
education.
Another possible explanation  has to do with the fact that education  increases  the
probability that the mother will  find outside employment  and, thus, that her children will
be called upon to substitute  for her in the home (Basu,  1993).  That is particularly true of
girls  who,  if they  do work,  are  likely  to do  so within  the  home  (looking  after younger
siblings  or  in  some  other  way  substituting  for  their  mothers  in the  performance  of
domestic chores).47
Yet  another  possibility  is  that  the  mother's  time  is  an  input  into  the  education
(production  of human  capital)  of their  children,  and  that  the  mother's  own  level  of
education raises  the productivity of this  input.  According  to this argument  (Behrman  et
al,  1999),  the mother's  own  level  of education  raises  the  demand  for her  services  as  a
home tutor rather than as a market  laborer and,  thus, raises the return to the time that her
children spend in education.
47 "If working women  do leave their children  behind at home,  they are put in  the custody of an older sibling,
often a daughter aged five or six years  old who is barely able to take care of herself.  These  young girls fall
into  a demanding  routine  of child-care  and  housework  very  quickly,  becoming  housekeepers  at  a very
young age and are robbed of the chance to attend school" (Chatterjee,  1992).
44Finally,  more  educated  parents  might  have  a better  knowledge  of the  returns  to
education  and/or  be in  a position  to help their  children  to exploit  the earning  potential
acquired through education.  In this case, the parents'  education  would be a proxy for the
effect  of the  returns  to  education.  The  possible  coexistence  of some  or  all  of these
mechanisms  may explain  the effect of the mother's education  on the probability  that her
children  will go to school but also the fact that this effect is not as pervasive as sometimes
assumed.  In  India,  as  we  saw,  the  probability  of children  working  full  time  was not
affected by their parents having at least  completed primary education  and the probability
of them working part time was not affected  by their parents having  less than  a completed
primary education.
7.2 Effects on health
Parents education, particularly the mother's,  seems to be an important determinant
of child  health.  Indeed,  there  appears to be  a strongly  negative  association  between  the
mother's  education  and  infant  or  child  mortality.  Strauss  and  Thomas  (1995)  find
significant  positive effects  of maternal  education on a series of inputs  into child health.
Many  different explanations  have been put forward  for these  statistical regularities,  based
on  the  assumption  that education  affects  human  capital  outcomes  either  by  raising  the
efficiency  with  which  inputs are used or by  increasing  the allocative  efficiency  of input
use.
Obviously,  parents'  education  also  reflects  the  resources  available  to  the
household  and  local  conditions.  Even  taking  these  factors  into  account,  however,  the
effect  of  parents'  education  persists  and  that  of  the  mother's  education  is  often
significantly  larger  than  that of the  father's  education.  However,  after  controlling  for
household  income and resources  and for  location  and  environmental  conditions,  Cigno,
Rosati, and Tzannatos  (2000) find no evidence  in the India survey that parents'  education
affects  the body  mass (which,  as already  explained,  is a predictor of health and  survival
probability, as well as a measure of nutritional status) of their school-age children.
45Chapter 8
Social  Security
We  have  looked  at  the  way  the  government  can  affect  child  labor  and  child
welfare  through  educational  and  health  policies.  There  is  another  form  of government
intervention,  however,  apparently  unrelated  to children,  which has  a powerful  influence
on household decisions concerning children: old-age  security.
8.1 Effects on fertility and  saving
There  is  much  long-standing  empirical  evidence  that  public pension  systems,  or
any other mechanism  for providing old-age  security that  does not rely on filial  support,
reduce  fertility.  Chemichovsky  (1982),  Nugent  and  Gillaspy  (1983),  Entwisle  and
Winegarden  (1984),  and  Jensen  (1990)  all  find  evidence that  pension  coverage  reduces
fertility in developing countries.  Cigno and Rosati  (1992,  1996) find that the same  is true
in  developed countries.  This  effect  is quite powerful:  Cigno and Rosati  (1992)  estimate
that more than three-quarters of the fertility reduction  in Italy between  1930 and 1985 was
attributable to the extension of pension coverage.
These empirical  findings are  consistent  with  the proposition  (see  Chapter  2) that
parental  decisions cannot be entirely explained  by altruistic  considerations  (the "children
first" hypothesis).  They  are consistent,  in particular,  with the idea (the "old-age  security"
hypothesis)  that parents  see  children  as  a  kind  of capital  asset,  expected  to  provide  a
48 stream of payments and personal services  in old age.
Consistent  with  the  old-age  security  hypothesis,  Caldwell  (1967)  reports  that  a
significant  proportion  of Ghanian  parents  gave  old-age  security  as  a  motive for having
children.  Ridker (1980) reports  a substantial fall  in fertility among women participating  in
a  no-birth  bonus  scheme  in  three  Indian  tea  estates.  Chernichovsky  (1982)  reports
evidence  from  an  Indian  village  that,  while  income  received  when  parents  are
4S  See Leibenstein  ( 1957), Cigno (1993),  and Rosati (1996).
46economically  active  (at the  stage  in  the  lifecycle  when  they  make  investments)  has  a
positive effect on fertility, expected  retirement income has a negative effect.
The  "asset"  characteristic  of children  is confirmed  by the  finding  of Cigno  and
Rosati (1992) that the development  of financial markets  in  Italy between  1930  and  1985
was  another  important  determinant  of the  fall  in  Italian  fertility.  If parents  saw  their
children  as a direct source of happiness rather than as an alternative  to financial  assets, the
expansion of trade  opportunities  made possible  by the development  of financial markets
would  have  had  a  positive  wealth-effect  on  fertility.  This  interpretation  is  further
supported  by the finding of Cigno and Rosati (1992,  1996,  1997) that,  in Western Europe,
Japan,  and the  USA,  social  security  coverage  has  a positive  effect on household  saving
when  the social security  deficit and other forms of public  intergenerational  transfers  are
controlled  for.  This  finding runs  counter to  conventional  wisdom  that social  security  is
inimical to growth.49 A more chilling sort of evidence  of the  "asset" nature of children is
reported  in Chapter  11, where we discuss children sold as slaves.
8.2 Implications  for child labor  and  economic growth
Social security  benefits help to reduce  child labor in three ways. First, by reducing
fertility,  they reduce the  pool of existing  children from which  child  labor is supplied.  In
addition  to this  direct effect,  there  are  two indirect  effects,  one short term  and the other
long  term.  The  short-term  effect  comes  from  a  change  in  household  strategy  towards
having  fewer  children  but  making  greater  investments  in  them  and  expecting  higher
returns.  Thus, the switch to a  low-fertility  strategy  induced  by social  security  is likely to
reduce child labor because a greater proportion of children will be sent to school.
The  long-term  effect  comes  though  economic  growth.  Despite  the  associated
increase in life expectancy  (as parents spend more on each  child), the reduction  in fertility
is likely to slow down  population  growth.  Combined with  higher savings, this  implies  a
gradual  increase  in  the  capital/labor  ratio  and  in  per  capita  income.  Higher  per capita
income  will  relax  the  household  budget  constraint,  thus  increasing  the  probability that
children  will be  sent to school.  Higher capital/labor  ration  will  lead to less  use of labor
generally  as a relative  labor scarcity  bids up real  wage rates and to less use of unskilled
49This comes  from the prediction  of conventional  life-cycle  theory that forced  saving in the  form  of social
security  taxes  displaces  voluntary  saving.  Cigno  (1993)  argues,  by  contrast,  that  social  security displaces
intra-family transfer  arrangements  rather than  asset accumulation.  Early evidence that social  security has a
negative  effect  on  saving  is  vitiated  by  the  failure  to  control  for  the  social  security  deficit  and  to  take
account of endogenous  fertility  changes (see Cigno and Rosati  1992, 1996).
47(including  child)  labor  in  particular,  as  greater  capital  intensity  makes  production
techniques more sophisticated.
Of course,  social  security  is not  the  only the  policy  that  helps  growth.  Indeed,
several  of  the  policies  that  have  beneficial  effects  on  child  labor  (such  as  public
investments  in health  and  education)  are  also conducive to  growth.  However,  since  the
sustainable rate of per capita income growth is equal to the difference between capital and
population  growth,  growth  effects  are  particularly  worth  mentioning  in  connection  with
social security, which increases capital accumulation and  reduces population  growth.
The  increase  in saving  induced by  social security  will also  help the development
of financial  markets.  This  is beneficial  in two ways:  first,  because  it makes  it easier  for
firms  to finance  their capital  investments  and  is thus  conducive  to  growth and  second,
because  it makes  it easier  for children,  or their  parents,  to  borrow  against  their future
earnings.  This,  as we pointed  out in  Chapter 3, increases the probability  that a child  will
go  to  school  and  encourages  investment  in  human  capital,  which  is  as  important  as
ordinary  capital  for economic  growth.  Either directly  or indirectly  through  its effect  on
growth,  the  induced  development  of financial  markets  will  thus  tend  to  reinforce  the
beneficial effects of social security on child labor.
48Chapter 9
The Market for Child Labor
We have seen that parental decisions concerning child labor are affected by many
considerations,  including the wage rate that the child could earn on the labor market, or
the implicit wage he or she could  earn working for his or her own parents.  We have not
concerned  ourselves with the market mechanisms, demand and supply, that determine
these wage rates. We come to that in the present chapter.
9.1 The demandfor child labor
Analysts  have  devoted  little  attention  to the  demand  for  child  labor,  either  from
the  theoretical  or  from  the  empirical  point  of view.  It  is  often  suggested  that  the
advantages  of child  labor  are  that  children  are  less  expensive  to  employ  than  adults,
children are easier to control, and  it is easier to get them to work hard.  However, none of
these propositions has found solid empirical support until now.
The demand  for children  to work  in the family  farm,  or family  enterprise,  is not
easy to measure.  This is not only because  of the problem  of measuring  the value of the
child's  (as  of anyone  else's)  marginal  contribution  to  production  but  also because  the
household  is  at the  same  time  both  a  buyer  and  a  seller of child  labor.  What  we  can
observe  is the amount of child  labor that the household  as a supplier of services  sells to
itself as  a  producer  of final  goods.  A  possible  way  to  evaluate  this  is  to  extend  the
approach  of Baker (1965)  on the allocation  of family members'  time by using time as an
input in family farming or other productive  activities. Levy (1985) followed this approach
in his analysis of child labor in Egypt. The demand for waged child labor should be easier
to estimate, but there is hardly any evidence on the subject.
In  future,  data  for  compiling  the  first  type  of  estimate  could  be  obtained  by
extending  household  surveys  to  include  (input  and  output)  information  on  the  family
business.50 Data for the second  type of estimates  could  be  obtained  by surveying  firms
rather  than  households.  However,  both  kinds  of data  are  likely  to  be  fraught  with
50 Some data set do contain this kind of information
49problems  of measurement  and  of deliberate  misreporting  (especially  where  the  illegal
employment of children  is concerned).
9.2.  How  wages, productivity, and technological change  affect the demand  for child
labor
With  so few children  overtly working in the formal  labor  market,  information  on
child wage rates  is often too sparse to  be of much use.  Given the number  of household
members,  however,  an  increase  in the  amount  of land  owned  or rented  by  a  farming
household raises the marginal  product of labor in general  and of child labor in particular.
Household survey  data on land size may be used to get indirect information  on the effect
of the  child  wage  rate  on  parental  decisions  affecting  the  child.  Since  the  marginal
product  of children  (mainly  girls)  employed  in  domestic  chores  and  the wage  rate  of
children  (mainly  boys)  working  in  the  labor  market  must  be  at  least  as  high  as  the
marginal product of own-farm  work, land size can be taken as indicator of the opportunity
cost of children's time spent in education.
The  theoretical  considerations  that  we  dealt with  in  Chapter  2 lead us to expect
that, other things being equal (in other words, holding constant,  among other things, total
household  income),  children  belonging  to farming households  with relatively  more land
are more likely  to work  because  their services  are  more  valuable.  Consistent  with  this
theory,  Cigno,  Rosati,  and  Tzannatos  (2000)  and  Rosenzweig  and  Everson  (1977)  find
that,  in  Indian  rural households,  land size  does increase  the probability  that a child will
work  (relative  to not  working at all)  and make  it more  probable  that they will  work full
rather than part time.
Technological  change  influences  both  the  demand  for,  and  the  supply  of,  child
labor.  For example,  if new technologies,  like mechanization,  or the use of fertilizers  and
improved  strains  are  introduced  in  agriculture,  more  skilled  manpower  is required.  The
demand for unskilled  labor in general and child labor in particular is then likely to fall. At
the same time,  the returns to education  are likely  to increase as a reflection  of the higher
demand for skilled  labor. This will reduce  the supply of child labor. The combined  effect
of reduced willingness to supply child  work and reduced willingness to employ unskilled
workers  is likely to be a reduction  in the use of children  for productive activities.
Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin  (1982)  report  indirect  evidence  that,  in  rural  India,  the
Green  Revolution  increased  the demand  for  child  education  and  reduced  the supply  of
child  labor.  Other  evidence  relating  to  Egypt  (Levy,  1985)  confirms  that  production
50technology  is  an  important  determinant  of  the  demand  for  child  labor.  Farming
households  that  use  more  capital-intensive  production  technologies  use  less  of their
children's  time  for  work,  have  fewer  children,  and  invest  more  in  their education  and
welfare.
9.3 International  labor  standards
International  conventions  or  unilateral  legislation  by  powerful  trading  nations51
that  prohibit  the  importation  of  goods  produced  with  the  work  of  children  ("labor
standards")  are  likely to  affect the  demand  for child  labor.  By  closing  certain  lucrative
markets,  the imposition  of such  standards  shifts  the demand  for  child  labor downwards,
reduces the equilibrium wage rate for child labor,  and triggers a substitution towards adult
labor (Basu,  1999). If it is not accompanied by measures in support of the countries where
child  labor  is  employed,  however,  labor  standards  amount  to  trade  sanctions.  As  they
reduce the welfare of the target countries,  particularly  the welfare of the poorest  families
from which most child labor springs,  the effect on child labor is then ambiguous.  On the
one hand, the adult wage rate will rise relative to the child wage rate, thus making it more
advantageous  for households to supply adult rather than child labor. On the other hand, in
households  close  to  the  subsistence  level,  the  rise  in  the  adult  wage  rate  may  not  be
enough to compensate for the income reduction caused  by the fall  in the child wage rate.
If adults are already working full time,  the outcome  might then be an increase rather than
a  decrease  in  child  labor.  As  we  saw  in  Chapter  4,  a  reduction  in  household  income
increases the probability that a child will be made work.
9.4 Would a ban on child labor work?
From  a theoretical  point  of view,  child  and  adult  labor  are just  two  factors  of
production.  The  standard analysis of factors  markets thus applies.  Basu and Van  (1998)
get more specific  results under the hypothesis:  (i) that child and adult labor are perfectly
substitutable  in production  (in other words, an hour of child work is equivalent to a given
fraction of an hour of adult work)  and (ii) that, provided their income is sufficiently high,
parents  will  not  send  their  children  to  work.52  Under  these  and  some  other  technical
assumptions,  Basu  and  Van  are  able  to  show  that  the  economy  is  likely  to  have  a
multiplicity  of possible  equilibrium  positions.  In  particular,  they  show  the  theoretical
5' An example  is the "Child Labor Deterrence  Act" in the US.
52  They assume,  in other words, that non-working children  are a kind of luxury good.
51possibility that there are two stable equilibria,  one characterized  by the presence,  side by
side,  of child and adult  labor and the other in which only adult  labor is employed.  In the
first type of equilibrium,  (adult and child) wage  rates are low, and in the second,  (adult)
wage  rates  are  high.  This  theoretical  finding  has  an  interesting  policy  implication
("benign intervention" as the authors call it).
As we saw  in Chapter  2,  for any given set  of prices and wage rates,  households
(or,  more  precisely,  the  people  within  them  who  make  the  decisions)  choose  how  to
allocate  their resources,  particularly  how to allocate the  time of their members  between
work  and  other  activities.  If the  children  of the  household  work,  it  then  means  that
sending children to work  is  in the  household's  (though not necessarily  in the children's)
best  interest.  Thus,  a successfully  enforced  ban  on child  labor would  make households
worse off.  Parents would consequently  connive with employers  to elude the ban, with the
result  that  public  resources  would  have  to  be  diverted  from  productive  uses  to try  to
enforce the  ban  and private  resources  to try to elude  it.  If we take prices  and wages as
given,  it  is thus clear that  prohibition  could  have  a very  large cost  in terrns of resource
misallocation and a very  low benefit in terms of reducing  child labor.
This  objection  to  the  use  of prohibition  would  disappear  if,  as  Basu  and  Van
maintain,  there  is an alternative  stable equilibrium with  higher adult wage rates in which
it is not  in any  household's  interest to  send their children to work.  If this were  the case,
then the ban would  be  self-enforcing,  in the  sense that nobody would have  an interest in
trying to return to a low-wage equilibrium with child labor.  Put more simply, the effect of
a  ban  on  child  labor  would  be  to  make  adult  labor  much  scarcer,  and  thus the  adult
equilibrium wage rate much higher.  As a result, households  would be at  least as well off
supplying  only  adult  labor  as  supplying  adult  and  child  labor  in  the  alternative
equilibrium.  The problem  with this theoretical  proposition,  attractive though  it may seem,
is that it may not apply in practice.
What  becomes  clear from  the  studies  at  which  we  are  looking,  only a minority
(often  a very small one)  of working children  receives a wage.  Most working  children  are
employed,  in one way or another,  by their own  parents. Even  when working  outside the
family  home  or  outside  the  family  farm  or  business,  children  may  be  supplying  their
services  to  a  neighbor  under  some  reciprocal  arrangement  negotiated  by  their  own
parents.  This being the case,  it would be  rather risky  to proceed  on the assumption  that
such  a  variety  of intra  and  inter-family  arrangements  can  be  modeled  as  if we  were
52dealing with a set of perfectly competitive  markets where independent agents buy and sell
labor anonymously  at an established  equilibrium wage rate. The very fact that, in most of
the  developing  world,  child  labor  is  either  not  banned  or  persists  despite  legal
prohibition53 constitutes prima facie evidence that things are not so simple.
Similar theoretical arguments  in favor of compulsion and similar reasons for being
cautious  about  its  practicability  relate  to  the  possible  existence  of alternative  growth
paths. Using appropriate  assumptions,  it is generally possible to invent a model economy
with  two  alternative  equilibrium  growth  paths,  one  characterized  by  low  capital,  low
human capital,  and  low  income  per head  and by the employment of child  labor, and the
other characterized  by high capital,  high human capital, and high  income per head and no
child  labor.  If both  paths  are  stable,  the  first  constitutes  a kind  of poverty  trap,  a  low-
development  equilibrium  from which  it  is  only  possible  to escape  by concerted  action.
The theory  of economic  growth  and  economic  development  is  full of such traps.  Their
implication  is that a drastic policy measure,  such as the prohibition of child  labor, which
makes  the persistence  of the existing  low-development  growth  pattern  unfeasible,  will
automatically  put  the  economy  on  a  course  that  will  eventually  tum  into  the  more
desirable growth path.  Such a policy is advocated  in Dessy (2000).
The objection  to the poverty trap argument  is similar to the objection  that applies
to  the  multiple  labor market  equilibrium  argument.  Having  established  the  theoretical
possibility that a more desirable alternative  exists and that such an alternative  is stable is
not  the  same  as  having  established  that  such  an  alternative  exists  in  the  real  world.
Furthermore,  if  what  we  are  talking  about  is  dynamic  equilibria  (in  other  words,
tendential growth  paths),  there  is  the  additional  problem  that  transformation  into  the
preferred  growth paths may take a very long time, maybe several generations.  Also, since
the  generations  caught  in  the  transition  from  one  growth  pattern  to  another  would
typically  be  worse  off than  if the  policy  were  not  enacted,  this raises  the question  of
whether the policy is defensible on equity grounds and of where to find the resources for
compensating those who suffer from it.
53  In India "...  the  Child Labour  (Prohibition  and  Regulation)  Act of  1986  ...  in effect  admits the  reality
that child labour is a socioeconomic  problem,  and one that is unlikely to disappear in the face of legislation"
(Chatterjee,  1992).  "Morocco  made  education  compulsory  in  1963.  But,  40  years  on,  the  Ministry  of
Education admits that 2.5m  children are out school"  (The Economist, 7-13 October,  2000).
53Chapter 10
Discouraging Child Labor
So  far  we  have  talked  mostly  of  why  there  is  child  labor,  and  what  its
consequences  and correlates are. We now concentrate  on what can be done about it.
10.1  Generalprinciples
The studies discussed  in detail  in this Handbook and the many others cited tend to
agree on two general  points.  One is that child  labor cannot be  viewed  in  isolation from
educational,  health,  fertility,  and  technological  issues.  The  other  is  that,  leaving  aside
extreme  forms of exploitation,  which  will be  addressed  in the next chapter,  child  labor
should not be regarded as an aberration  but rather as a rational household response to an
adverse  economic  environment.54 Beyond  that,  the  following  proposition  receives
consistent empirical support:
(i) Forbidding  children to work or making school attendance compulsory without
changing  the economic environment would, if effectively enforced, leave not only parents
but also children worse off.
By definition,  anything  that  prevents an adult  person  from  doing what he or she
would otherwise  do makes that person worse off. Parents,  therefore,  would suffer from  a
ban on child labor and would consequently be tempted to evade it. Matters are less clear-
cut where  the children themselves  are concemed.  All of the studies that  directly address
the  issue report that children  working  full time tend to have  better nutritional  status than
children  who  study and that children  who attend  school  and work at the same time  fare
worst of all.  Therefore,  the  policy  would  have  an ambiguous  effect  on  the welfare  of
children,  who  would  end  up  with  possibly  more  human  capital  but  probably  poorer
health,  and  a  negative  effect  on  the  welfare  of their  parents,  who  would  be  forced  to
depart from what they regard as their optimal choices.
54  This, remember,  is true irrespective  of whether parents are moved  by altruistic  or selfish motivations  (see
Chapter 2).
54Therefore,  prohibiting  child  labor  or  making  school  attendance  compulsory
without changing  the economic environment  that makes child work  in the interest  of the
parents  and  possibly  even  of the  child  is  difficult  to enforce.5  As  we  pointed  out  in
Chapter 9, the modest reduction  in child labor that would result  from such policies would
have  a  large  cost  in  terms  of  resources  diverted  from  productive  uses  to  policy
enforcement  on the one hand and evasion on the other.56 Indeed,  restrictions on the legal
employment of child labor,  in situations where poverty is widespread,  have an even  larger
cost.  They  push  children  out of the  formal  into  the  informal  sector  (Chatterjee,  1992)
where wage  rates  are lower and children  are exposed  to greater  risks than  in the formal
sector.57  In extreme  cases, the effect of these  restrictions  is  to push  children  out of their
families onto the streets. We shall look at the consequences  of this in the next chapter.
In  the  next two  sections,  we  identify  a  number  of direct  policy  measures  that
remove  children  from  the  labor  market  and  some  indirect  policy  measures  that aim  to
change  the  economic  environment  in  the  desired  direction.  Taken  together,  these
measures  have  the  potential  reduce child  labor without  compulsion  or  prohibition.  The
last two sections examine ways of checking that this potential is realized.
10.2 Indirect  measures
We now examine a range  of policies that,  although not directly aimed  at reducing
child  labor,  have  that  effect  in  practice.  Our  propositions  stem  from  the  theoretical
discussion  contained  in  Chapters  2  and  3 and  are  strongly  supported  by  the empirical
studies reviewed  in subsequent  chapters.  Therefore,  we illustrate  our policy prescriptions
with  numerical  results  from  the  three countries  that we  have  studied  in  some  depth  --
India, Morocco,  and Vietnam.
Table  11,  drawn from  Cigno,  Rosati, and  Tzannatos  (2000),  shows the  estimated
effects  of small variations in the observed  levels of certain policy variables  on the use of
time by school-age  children  in rural  India.  Table  12,  drawn  from the  same study,  shows
the  simulated  effects  of more  radical  policy  changes,  consisting  of increasing  a  policy
55  "A  legislative  solution,  in  the  opinion  of many  Indian  experts,  is  neither  practical  nor  capable  of
achieving  its purpose"  (Chatterjee,  1992).
56  These  propositions  do  not  take  into  account  the  theoretical  possibility  that  a  ban  on  child  labor  or
compulsory  education  would  trigger  a  switch  to  a  new  (static  or  dynamic)  equilibrium,  where  nobody
would have  an  interest  in supplying  or employing child  labor,  so that  prohibition or compulsion  would  no
longer  be  required.  For the  reasons put forward  in the last chapter,  such arguments  must be  regarded  with
the utmost caution at the present state of knowledge.
" As one aid  worker  put it, referring  to Morocco,  "if they can't send them  to work,  they  will send them  to
beg." (The Economist, 7-13 October,  2000).
55variable  from the minimum  to the maximum  value  found  in the sample. Table  13, based
on Rosati and Tzannatos (2000), does the same for Vietnam. Tables 14 A and B, based on
Rosati  (2000),  simulate  the effects  of a  range of educational,  health, and  re-distributive
policies for Morocco.
(ii) Providing  schools close to communities reduces the incidence of child labor
and increases household  expenditure on  the education of their children.  It also
reduces  fertility and improves child  nutrition.
There  is empirical  evidence that  the  availability  of a  school  near to the  place of
residence encourages  school attendance  and discourages  child labor. However,  according
to many  studies of Latin America  and the Indian  sub-continent,58 the effect of providing
local  schools  is to induce  children who  would otherwise work  full time to attend  school
and work at the same time rather than to study full time.
TABLE  1  1:  MARGINAL  EFFECTS OF CERTAIN VARIABLES  ON TIME ALLOCATION  IN
RURAL INDIA
Work Only  Work and Study  Study Only
Poverty  -0.52  -0.78  1.30
Tenure  -0.99  -0.06  1.04
Land Size  1.25  1.11  -1.29
Type of School Available  -0.12  -1.08  1.20
Mother's Education (Primary)  -0.07  10.09  -10.02
Mother's Education  (Secondary)  -2.43  3.14  -0.72
Mother's Education  (Tertiary)  -3.70  -3.53  7.23
*Change  in probability  (percentage  points) due to a unit change of the variable  in
the first column
Table  11  shows that,  in rural India,  providing a middle  school in  a village where
there  is currently  only a primary school59 would reduce the probability that a school-age
child works  by  1.2  percentage  points. Table  12  shows that a more radical  improvement,
increasing  provision  from  nothing  to  secondary  level,  would  raise  the  probability  of
full-time  school  attendance  by 3.6 percentage  points,  mainly because of the reduction  in
the number of children that both work and attend  school.
58 For example, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos  (1997) and Ravallion and Wodon  (2000).
59  Keep  in mind  that nearly  all  of the  villages  in the NCAER  survey  (95 percent)  have  at least a primary
school  and that  providing a higher grade  of school reinforces  the demand  for the lower  grades of education
(see Chapter 5).
56TABLE 12: SIMULATED  CHANGES  IN PROBABILITY OF CERTAIN POLICIES ON TIME
ALLOCATION IN RURAL INDIA
Work Only  Work and Study  Study Only
Reducing poverty  -1.56  -2.36  3.92
Distributing land  0.71  4.88  -5.59
Providing primary and Middle school  -0.36  -3.26  3.62
Reducing infant mortality  -3.47  -6.81  10.28
TABLE 13:  SIMULATED IN THE SCHOOL/WORK PROBABILITIES  DUE TO CHANGES IN
KEY VARIABLES  IN VIETNAM  (1998)
Changes in the  Income  "Household  Siblings  Siblings  Education  Education  Tuition  Land
probability of:  size  Age 0-5  Age 6>  Father  Mother
School only  0.74  1.10  -0.79  -2.11  0.69  0.42  0.11  -0.17
School and work  -0.12  -0.26  -0.29  1.43  -0.36  0.22  -0.14  0.18
Work only  -0.51  -0.86  1.39  0.82  -0.25  -0.47  0.03  0.01
Neither school nor  -0.  0.01  -0.31  -0.13  -0.08  -0.17  0.00  -0.02
w  ork  __  __  _  0_  __0  _  I  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Table  14A  reports  on  a  similar  policy  experiment  for  rural  areas  of Morocco,
where  school  facilities  are limited.  Making  a primary school  available  in every  village
("duar")  would increase  school attendance  by about 3  percentage  points  for boys but by
more  than  7  points  for  girls.  The  boys  who  would  start attending  school  would  come
mainly from  the pool of those who  are currently  working. The girls would come mainly
from  the  pool  of those  reported  as being  "idle"  but who,  in  the  case  of Morocco,  are
almost certainly performing household chores.
TABLE 14A:  SIMULATED CHANGE IN  SCHOOL/WORK STATUS IF SCHOOL
AVAILABILITY  INCREASED IN  RURAL AREAS  IN MOROCCO
~.Observed  If Primary'  school in every
locality
________  _______  ______  'Boys,  Girls  Boys  Girls
School only  56.9  37.5  62.7  44.1
Work only  22.3  23.4  19.9  21.0
Neither school nor work  18.8  38.4  17.4  34.4
These effects are very important not only in themselves  but also because,  as we
saw in earlier chapters, the presence of a school nearby and the consequent reduction  in
the  probability  that a  school-age  child  will work  will  induce  parents to  give  birth to
fewer  children  and  to  take  better  care  of  each  child  who  is  born.  Furthermore,
households  will  spend  more  on  the  education  of every  school-age  child  who  attends
57school.  Therefore,  providing  schools  affects  much  more  than  education;  it  increases
school  attendance  but also  reduces  child  work (the  two,  remember,  are  not  mutually
exclusive) and is likely to reduce morbidity and mortality throughout the lifecycle.
(iii) Universal  income subsidies to parents are an expensive way of discouraging
child labor because some of the subsidy will end up as adult consumption,  and are
counter-effective  in families where children would otherwise study full time.  Income
subsidies targeted at poorer  families, whose children are unlikely to attend school  in
the  absence  of policy  interventions,  are  more  cost-effective.  Therefore,  income
redistribution could help  to  reduce child labor,  encourage school attendance, and
improve the nutritional  status of  children.
The India study divides  the sample into two parts: households  below (42 percent
of the NCAER sample) and above  (58 percent)  an expert-defined poverty line. Each part
is  then  divided  into  a  lower  and  an  upper  segment.  Table  11  showed  that  moving  a
household up a segment would  have a very  modest effect on the probability that a child
belonging  to  that household  will  stop  working  or  attend  school.  Table  12  shows  that
even  lifting the household  from  the lower  segment  below the poverty  line to the upper
segment  above the  poverty  line would reduce the probability  that a child works by only
a modest 4 percent  and increase the probability that the child would attend school (either
part or full time) by just  1.6 percentage points. However,  the probability of studying full
time would  increase by nearly 4 percentage points.
We obtained similar results for Vietnam (Table  13),  where a 10 percent increase  in
household income would  increase the probability of a child attending school  by only 0.7
percentage  points.  It  is interesting  that the largest  part of the change  would be due to  a
reduction  in  the  number of "working  only"  children.  In  other words,  the policy  would
encourage mainly part-time rather than full-time education.
For  Morocco,  we  carried  out  the  following  policy  experiment.  Since  subsidies
must  be  financed  through  taxation,  we  simulated  the  effects  of income  re-distribution
rather  than  the  effect  of an  income  increase per se.  Table  14B  shows  the  estimated
changes in the use of children's time due to a re-distribution of income from the upper to
the lower income quintile.  It is assumed that  10  percent of the income of the households
belonging to the higher  income quintile is taxed away and that this revenue  is distributed
to the households  belonging  to the lower income  quintile.  One effect of this policy  is to
58increase  the enrollment  rate.  However,  due  to the  previously  mentioned non-linearity  of
the relationship  between  income  and child  labor supply, the effects are  far from  large  --
the overall enrollment rate  increases  by less than  I percent. This helps to make the point
that income subsidies are a very costly way of dealing with the child labor problem.
TABLE 14B: EFFECTS OF CERTAIN POLICIES IN  MOROCCO
Urban  . Rural
._______________  _  - . Boys  - Girls  Boys  Girls
(a) Observed
School only  87.5  81.5  |  56.9  37.5
Work only  5.6  3.5  22.3  23.4
Neither school nor work  6.6  14.9  18.8  38.4
b) After ferti ity reduction
School only  86.6  81.1  59.2  42.4
Work only  4.7  3.1  20.0  19.8
Neither school nor work  8.6  15.7  20.1  37.7
c) After income re-distribution
School only  87.8  81.9  |  59.0  38.5
Work only  5.4  3.4  23.2  24.0
Neither school nor work  6.04  14.3  36.0  37.1
d) After inc  me growth
School only  88.4  82.2  ]  57.8  |  38.3
Work only  5.3  3.8  J  22.8  23.9
Neither school nor work  6.1  37.3  J  17.4  37.2
(iv)  Land redistribution could increase the  incidence of child labor because it
would increase the productivity of labor in households that receive additional land and
reduce it in those from which land is taken away. This would increase the probability  of
work  for  children  in  lower-income  households  and  reduce  it  for  children  in
higher-income households  where parents are  unlikely  to  make  their children work
anyway.
As we saw  in Chapter  9,  giving more land to a farming household  would,  other
things being equal,  increase the probability  that the children  belonging to that household
will work rather than study because the marginal value of their labor would rise. Table  11
showed that, for the average household  in rural India, bringing the quantity of land up one
class (on a 5-point scale going from zero to "large") would  increase the probability that a
school-age  child  belonging  to  that  household  works  by  1.4  percentage  points.  The
probability of school attendance  falls hardly at all but that of full-time study becomes  1.3
percent lower. Table  12 shows that giving a "large"  farm to a formerly landless household
(and taxing the household  at the  same time, so  as to keep  its income unchanged)  would
59increase the probability  that a child in that household  will work, either part or full time,
by nearly 6 percentage points.
For Vietnam,  Table  13  shows  that the  probability  of a  child  working  increases
with the size of the cultivable  land utilized by the household.
(v) Policies that increase  a child's chances of  surviving into adulthood  reduce the
probability that a school-age child will work and increase the probability that the child
will go to school.  These policies also increase the consumption of school-age children
and  the amount spent by households on the education of each child who attends school
In the India  study, the effects of policies affecting  the health  status and thus the life
expectancy of a child (such as mass immunization and the supply of safe drinking water)
are  captured  by  the village-level  survival  rate.  These  local  survival  rates  also  reflect
climatic  conditions  and the effects  of parental  actions (private  expenditures  on health,
nutrition,  standards  of hygiene,  and so  on)  aimed  at ensuring  the survival of their own
children. Changes in these survival rates, however, may be taken to reflect the direct and
indirect effects of policy  changes.  Under the heading "reducing  infant mortality,"  Table
12  reports  the  effects  of  increasing  the  infant  survival  rate  from  the  minimum
encountered  in  the  sample,  60  percent,  to  the  maximum,  100  percent.  These  can  be
interpreted  as the ultimate  effects60 of enacting  measures  in  the fields  of public  heath,
sanitation,  and  so  on,  such  that  children  who  receive  from  their  parents  the  average
amount  of nutrition  and  health  care  are  certain  to  live  at  least  until  the  age  of six.
Adopting  such a  policy  would  reduce  the probability that a  school-age  child  would  be
made to work by more than  10 percent and would increase the probability that the child
would study full time by the same amount.
Thus,  just  as  the  effects  of educational  policies  extend  beyond  the  education
sector,  so the  effects  of health  policies  extend  beyond  health.  Policies  such  as  mass
immunization,  supplying  safe  drinking  water,  and  so  on  reduce  the  probability  that  a
child will work  and  increase  the  probability  that a child will  be  sent to school.  Indeed,
these  side effects  of public  health  policy appear  to be  significant.  The  reason,  as we
have seen, is that, when mortality rates are low,  parents have an incentive to spend more
not only on the  education of their children who attend  school but also on their nutrition.
60  Taking into account  the  way  in  which  parents  respond to the  policy  by changing  the level  of their own
effort  (in  providing  nutrition,  medical  care,  and so  on.)  to  ensure the  survival of their own children.  For a
theoretical analysis of the interaction between private and public action  in this context, see Cigno (1998).
60Thus, the policy reduces morbidity and mortality not only directly but also indirectly  by
secondary parental actions.
(vi)  Increasing  the education of women has positive but uneven effects  on school
attendance  and child labor.
In  general,  the  education  of women  is  a  powerful  engine  of progress.  In  rural
India,  however,  the  effects of a mother's  level of education  on the school enrolment  and
labor participation of her school-age  children  are  somewhat mixed.  Table  11  shows that
increasing  the  mother's  education  from  less  than  completed  to  completed  primary
schooling would  reduce the probability of her children  working  by almost 9 percentage
points  and  increase  the  probability  that  they  would  study  full  time  by  the  same
percentage.  Increasing her education  from primary to middle-school  level  would reduce
the probability that her children would work by over 7 percentage points. As explained  in
Chapter 7, the reason  for this uneven  pattern may be  that the mother's  education  affects
household  decisions about the allocation of her children's time  in several  different and, in
some respects, conflicting ways.  The father's education has no effect at all.
In Vietnam (Table  13), the father's education affects  the decision to make  a child
study full time.  The mother's education,  on the other hand,  reduces the probability that a
child will study full time but increases the probability that a child will work and study  at
the  same  time.  This  is  probably  due  to  the  fact  that,  in  Vietnam,  women  with  higher
education  are  more  likely  to find  work outside  the  household  than  in  other  developing
countries.  As  we  have  already  observed,  an  increase  in  the mother's  level  of education
thus raises the demand for child labor to substitute for the mother's time.
(vii) The extension of old-age security and credit availability to poor  parts of the
community,  primarily the  rural poor,  which  is where  most  child labor comes from,
reduces  fertility and  child labor and increases  school attendance.
We  saw,  in Chapter  8,  that pension coverage  is a  powerful  disincentive  to  have
children,  especially  for the most disadvantaged  parents,  who have  no alternative  means
(in other words,  savings) of providing  for their own  old age.  We also  saw,  in Chapter 3,
that credit rationing  is  an  important cause of educational  under-investment.  By reducing
the number  of children,  particularly  in  those  households  that are  more  likely to  supply
child  labor,  old  age  security  thus  reduces  the pool  from which  child  labor  is recruited.
Credit facilities reduce the fraction of this pool that becomes child labor.
61In order to give a quantitative  assessment of the effects of social  security on child
labor,  we  simulated,  for  Morocco,  what would  happen  if a  family  reduced  their  total
number of children by one.6' Table  14B shows that this would increase  school attendance,
especially  among  girls,  and  reduce  child  labor.  Consistent  with  our earlier  remarks,  we
found that the increase in female  enrollment came mainly from a reduction  in the number
of girls  reportedly  doing  nothing  (but  in  reality  performing  household  chores  by  our
reckoning).  As  well  as  increasing  the  overall  enrollment  rate,  a  reduction  in  fertility
would thus tend to reduce the educational gender gap.
(viii)  Economic  growth  helps  to  reduce  child labor,  but  policies fostering
economic growth cannot be relied upon to reduce child labor  in the short run.
Growth-enhancing  policies  increase  the capital/output  ratio and thus wage  rates.
However,  as has been  seen  in middle-income  countries  like Brazil,  India,  and  Thailand,
without  redistribution,  and  without  policies  specifically  aimed  at  making  it
disadvantageous  for parents to send their children  to work, a country would have to reach
a very high  level  of development before  market  forces alone could eliminate child  labor.
As  Chatterjee  (1992)  remarks,  child  labor,  once  prevalent  in  developed  countries,  was
gradually reduced  and eventually  eliminated there by the process of industrialization,  but
the same is not happening  in today's developing countries.
We  have  looked  at  a number  of growth-enhancing  policies.  An unconventional
policy,  based  on  the  findings  of Cigno  and  Rosati  (1992,  1996,  1997),  consists  of
introducing old-age  social security or extending its coverage to poor families.  By slowing
down  population  growth  and  stimulating  household  saving,62 this policy  would  have a
positive  effect  on  capital  accumulation  and  thus  on  real  per  capita  income  growth.  A
conventional  policy  consists  of  improving  capital  markets.  This  too,  however,  is
facilitated  by the increase in household saving triggered by social security.  As we  saw in
Chapter  3, easier credit would  help to reduce  child  labor not only indirectly  through the
6i  In order to relate these effects to a hypothetical  increase in the proportion of households covered by social
security  or in  the  level  of coverage  (the  size  of the  pension),  we  would  need  an  estimate  of the effect  of
social  security on fertility  in Morocco.  This we do not have. However,  we  know from a wide range  of cross-
country and single country studies (see Chapter  10) that, where it was estimated, this effect turned  out to be
substantial.  It  is realistic  to assume  that the  fertility  reduction  hypothesized  in these  simulations  could be
achieved  by extending  social security  from its present level to the whole population.
62  Recall  that,  contrary  to  conventional  wisdom,  compulsory  saving  in  the  form  of  social  security
contributions  tends  to  crowd  out  intra-family  transfers  rather  than  voluntary  saving.  See  Chapter  8 and
Cigno (1993).
62relative  price and wage  effects associated  with growth  but  also directly by  relaxing  the
liquidity constraint on educational investment.
The introduction of improved technology also helps growth. If the new technology
increases  the demand for skilled  labor (as in the case of the so-called  Green  Revolution),
this  makes it more advantageous  for parents  to have fewer children and to invest more in
the  education  of the  children  that  they  do  have.  However,  some  degree  of direct  or
indirect  re-distribution  is needed to allow the poorest  families to  break out of the high-
fertility,  low  human-capital  vicious  circle.  If redistribution  is  in  the  form  of free  or
subsidized  health and  educational facilities,  this further strengthens the positive  effect on
fertility and school attendance.
Therefore,  several  of the policies that help  to reduce  child  labor  in the  short run
also have a beneficial long-term  effect via higher growth. How  large is the second effect?
To answer  this question,  we simulated,  for Morocco,  the effects of a  10  percent increase
in  income  (expenditure)  for all households.  Table  14B  shows that  these effects are very
small,  much smaller than those of income re-distribution.  The explanation  is simply that,
because  the  income  elasticity  of child  labor  decreases  as  income  increases,  income
redistribution  from  the  rich  to  the  poor  has  a  more  powerful  effect  on  reducing  child
labour  than  a  universal  income  increase.  This  suggests  that  growth  without  re-
distribution would take too long, maybe many generations,  to have a noticeable  effect on
child  labor.  However,  our  simulation  exercise  underestimates  (we  cannot  say  by  how
much) the effects  of growth,  because  it does  not take  account of the associated  relative
price and wage rate changes.
10.3 Direct measures
A more  direct way of reducing child  labor is to offer households direct payments
conditional on the child not working and/or attending school.  Even if school attendance is
a  condition  for  obtaining  the  payment,  such  payments  differ  from  conventional
scholarships  in  that  their  primary  purpose  is  to  discourage  child  labor  and  only
secondarily  to  allow  talented  children  or young  people of modest  means  to  obtain  an
education.  While  a  scholarship  is usually  conditional  on  a  high  level  of scholastic  or
academic  performance,  such conditionality  is either absent  or set at a very basic  level  in
schemes that have the child's withdrawal  from the labor force as their primary  objective.
What  these  schemes  do,  essentially,  is  "buy"  a child's  time.  By  way  of example,  we
63briefly  describe  three  projects  carried  out  respectively  in  Morocco,  Bangladesh,  and
Mexico.
The  BAJ Program in  Morocco.  In  1996,  the  World  Bank  began  financing
Morocco's  Social  Priorities  Program,  known  by  its  Arabic  acronym  BAJ.  A  similar
program  was  implemented  in Bangladesh.  The  mission of BAJ  programs  is to increase
access of the rural  poor to basic  social  services,  such as preventive  and curative  health
care, maternal  and neonatal care,  and primary education.  The BAJ has three features that
distinguish it from other social investment initiatives in Morocco  and elsewhere.  First, in
order  to  reach  the  rural  poor,  BAJ  resources63 are  targeted  to  the provinces  that  rank
lowest  in an objective  poverty  scale.  Second,  it has a multi-sector  approach,  designed  to
exploit potential  synergies,  for example,  between  health and educational  policies.  That is
highly  commendable  because,  as  all  the  evidence  reported  in  the  preceding  chapters
indicates, there are  important spillovers,  for example  from education  into health and vice
versa.  Third,  the  BAJ  decentralizes  service  delivery  and  decision  making,  holding
provincial authorities  responsible for the planning,  implementation,  and monitoring of the
program.
The FFE in Bangladesh. This  program  aims  to  promote  school  attendance  by
"buying"  children's time. Households  participating  in the program  receive  monthly food
rations so long as they send their children to school.  Between  1991  and  1998, 2.2 million
children  (13  percent  of  total  national  school  enrollment)  were  participating  in  the
program.  Potential participants are  selected  in two  stages. Central  administration  chooses
a number of areas on the basis of their degree  of underdevelopment.  The local community
is  then  left  to  decide,  on  the  basis  of locally  available  information,  which  of  the
households located  in the target areas should be allowed to participate  in the program.
Mexico 's Progresa  Program. Initiated in  1997, this program  subsidises education,
health  care,  and  nutrition  in  poor  rural  households.  Its  aim  is  to  reduce  poverty  and
increase  investment  in  human capital,  thus breaking  intergenerational  poverty.  Progresa
covers 2.6 million families, about 80 percent of the population  in extreme  poverty  in rural
areas.  It  provides  grants  to  poor  families  for  each  child  under  the  age  of  18  who  is
enrolled  in school  between  the third  grade  of primary and  the third  grade  of secondary
school.  The grants  are higher for higher  grades and  are  slightly  higher for girls than  for
63  The  program  does not actually  provide  additional  funding  but rather "protects"  the  portion  of provincial
budgets devoted to activities promoted by the BAJ.
64boys. For a child in the third year of secondary  school, the grant is equal to 46 percent of
the  average  earnings  of an  agricultural  worker.  Families  of children  who  missed  more
than  15  percent  of school  days  in  a  month  do  not  receive  the  grant  for  that  month.
Progresa has pushed up enrolment  at all school levels, with the largest effect (17 percent)
having  been on the transition  from  sixth grade to the first year of secondary  school (the
point at which, traditionally,  most children drop out of school).
Unlike the policies  examined  in the  previous  section  that reduce  child  labor  by
increasing human capital,  health, income, and so on, these measures  have no major effect
other than  that  of removing  children  from  the  labor  force.  Even  education  cannot  be
assumed  to  be  greatly  improved  by  these  programs,  because  these  grants,  unlike
conventional scholarships,  are conditional  on school attendance  rather than  performance.
The  question  then  arises,  even  more  than for the policies  discussed  in the  last  section,
whether the benefit  is substantial enough to justify the cost.  The costs, it must be kept in
mind,  include  not only payments  made to the parents  and the  cost of administering  the
scheme  but  also the loss of the product of child labor.6 4 Some possible  answers  to this
question are discussed in the next section.
10.4 Program  evaluation
In  order to measure  the  effectiveness  of a  program,  it  is essential  to  distinguish
between  changes resulting from the program itself and those that are the consequences  of
changes in other variables.  If the objective is to reduce child labor,  one needs information
on child labor both before and after the implementation  of the program.  Furthermore, the
program  should  be designed  as an experiment,  selecting  the areas or groups  exposed  to
"treatment"  in a way that will make  it possible to apply standard statistical techniques for
establishing  the  effect  of the treatment.  However,  only  rarely  are  the areas  or groups
chosen  according  to  a strict  experimental  control  plan.  Political  considerations  and  the
(perfectly understandable)  desire to concentrate effort on those groups in the greatest need
conflict with the aim of being able to measure the effects of the  intervention.  Where the
program  is  a  pilot  study  specifically  designed  to  ascertain  whether  it  would  be  worth
extending  the  scheme  to  a  wider  population,  these  considerations  should  take  second
place to the aim of making it possible to evaluate the program's effects.
64  We  are referring,  of course, to the  output of children  employed  in legitimate  production  activities,  not in
begging,  soldiering, or prostitution.
65Nevertheless,  where  the  intervention  is  not  designed  as  a  proper  experiment,
various devices  can be used to try and  extract  some information  about  its effectiveness.
For example,  one may exploit the fact that only some areas are included  in the program or
that the program started at different dates  in different  areas  in order to try to identify the
effects of the  intervention.  The  exercise  may  be  vitiated,  however,  by  the fact that the
areas to be "treated" were not chosen at random and that the selection criteria may not be
observable  by the analyst.  That is known  as the "endogenous  placement"  problem.  If the
areas where  the program  is implemented  have characteristics  that are  not observable  by
the researcher,  the statistical  results may be biased  because the selection  criteria are not
taken  into consideration  in making the estimates.  One of these unobserved characteristics
may be the presence  or absence  of a powerful  political  lobby,  and another could be the
ability  of those  in  charge  of implementing  the  program,  which  may  vary  from  area to
area. Biases in the results can be avoided by using appropriate  econometric techniques.65
We now go on to examine two attempts  at evaluating the effects of programs  that
aim  to reduce  child labor or  increase  school  attendance.  One of these  attempts concerns
one  of the  BAJ  programs.  Jacobi  (2000)  used  a  variety  of statistical  techniques66  to
estimate the effects of the Morocco program.67 His main finding is that the provinces  that
are covered  by the BAJ program do not show significant overall gains  in access to health
facilities (as measured  by clinic  visits and medicine  acquisition)  or in school  enrollment.
However,  a more detailed  analysis of girls'  school  enrollment indicates that a majority of
the  provinces  covered  by the  program  experienced  a  significant  improvement.  These
gender effects  are obscured  in the aggregate  results as the BAJ provinces  that have been
positively  affected  by the  program  are  included  with those  that  did  not experience  any
improvement.
The Food-for-Education  (FFE) program  in rural Bangladesh  has been analyzed  in
68 Ravallion and  Wodon  (2000).  Their results seem to indicate that the program  increases
school  attendance  by  about  16  percent  but  reduces  child  labor  much  less  (by  about 4
percent).  These  findings  need  to  be  qualified.  First  of  all,  Ravallion  and  Wodon
65 For example,  fixed or random  effects estimators.
66 Fixed and random-effect  estimates,  finite-mixture  models, and so on.
67 The empirical  analysis  is based on refinements of the basic differences-in-differences  approach.  The most
important refinement consists in allowing for heterogeneous  program  effects  at the province level.
68  The  strategy  followed  by  Ravallion  and  Wodon  for  dealing  with  the  endogenous  placements  problem
exploits  the  two-tier  process  employed  in selecting  participants  for  the  program  to  identify  a  valid
instrument.
66hypothesize  that  schooling  is  not  actually  displacing  work  but  leisure.  This  may  be  a
natural  assumption  to  make  in  the  developed  world  but  not  necessarily  in  the
impoverished  developing world, especially  in a rural context.  Second,  the authors do not
examine  what  happens  to the  relatively  large  number  of children  who  are  reportedly
neither attending  school nor going to work (see the discussion  in Chapter  1).  It could be
that the children  most affected by the program  are those who fall into that category.69 For
example,  this  seems  to  have  been  the  case  in  Morocco,  where  the  increase  in  the
availability  of schools  increased  child  enrollment  mainly  by  ieducing  the  number  of
children who were "idle."
There  is another  aspect of the Bangladesh  study that,  although  not discussed  by
the authors, conveys relevant information.  As is well known, targeting is essential to these
kinds of program. From the estimates  presented  by Ravallion and  Wodon,  it emerges that
observable  household  characteristics  are  a  very  poor  predictor  of placement  in  the
program. This could mean  either that the community adopted  criteria  other than  need  to
select  households for the program or that observable characteristics  are poor indicators of
actual  need.  Both  these  alternatives  are,  for  obvious  reasons,  disturbing.  A  third,  less
harmful,  interpretation  is that all the households located  in FFE areas are so close to being
in need that,  in view of measurement  errors,  observable characteristics  cannot be used to
distinguish among them.
10.5 Program  supervision
Another  important  issue in the design of a program,  whether this has  to do  with
child labor reduction or with anything else, is how much of the budget should be allocated
to  supervision.  There  is  an  understandable  desire  on  the  part  of program  financers  to
ensure  that  as  much  of the  funds  allocated  to  a program  as  possible  should  go  to  the
intended  beneficiaries.  Indeed,  as recalled  in Kilby  (2000),  there  is  increasing political
pressure  by  donor  countries,  to  minimize  administration  in  the  cost  of international
agencies'  programs. This is all very well, but it has to be understood that the success of a
program,  as of any other activity, is measured by the output not by the input. Spending  10
percent more, say, on buying children's time  is no guarantee that child labor will decrease
more  than  if the  same  amount  of money  were  spent  in  other  ways.  Hypothetically
69  On  the  issue  of children  who  are  apparently  idle,  see also  Cigno,  Rosati,  and  Tzannatos  (2000)  and
Rosati  (2000).
67speaking,  better results might be achieved  if that extra  10  percent  were used to increase
the cost-effectiveness  of existing expenditure.
It  could  happen,  for  example,  that  money  is  misspent  on  buying  the  time  of
children who would  not work anyway  or help with the harvest rather than of girls at risk
of ending up as prostitutes  (more about this in the next chapter). It could also happen that
parents  send  their  children  to  school  in order to qualify  for the  subsidy and  then  make
their children work as much as possible outside  school hours. If this were the case,  child
labor would  not be reduced,  and  school  attendance  would not produce good educational
results because  the children would  be too tired and sleepy to take advantage  of it. Better
results  might  be  obtained  by  spending  less  for  buying  children's  time  and  more  on
ensuring that the children selected are the right ones or that parents deliver on their side of
the  contract.  Thus,  there  is  a  potential  trade-off  between  resources  that  are  directly
distributed  and resources  that are used to increase the effectiveness  of the program.
After  analyzing  1,426  World  Bank projects  completed  between  1981  and  1991,
Kilby (2000) concludes  that the marginal  benefit of program  supervision  tends to exceed
the  marginal  cost.70 He  estimates  that,  with  the  sample  average  of 20  staff-weeks  of
annual  supervision,  the  economic  rate  of return  to  a  project  is  nearly  16  percent.
Increasing  the annual  supervision  rate to  30 weeks  would increase  that rate of return  to
nearly  17 percent.  Given the size of the portfolio,  even a small improvement  would yield
large  benefits  in  absolute  termns.71  Hence,  additional  resources  should  be  spent  on
supervision rather than on direct expenditure.  Although Kilby's analysis concerns lending
programs,  there is no a priori reason  for believing  that the same  is not true of programs
aimed  at  reducing  child  labor  or  of any  other  type  of program.  Here  too,  properly
designed  experiments  are  needed  to  evaluate  the  effectiveness  of  money  spent  on
supervision.
70  In  the  majority  of cases,  there  is  a  greater than  97.5  percent  likelihood  that  the  marginal  benefit  of
supervision exceeds the marginal cost.
7'  Kilby  estimates that  adding  I percent  to the economic  rate of return  of this portfolio  of projects  would
raise benefits, in present value terms,  by $248 million.
68Chapter 11
The Pathology of Child Labor
We  have  deliberately  kept  away,  until  now,  from  discussing  extreme  forms  of
child  exploitation:  the  use of children  in  activities  that are  either  morally  repugnant  or
dangerous to the child's health and even life. Our motivation for treating them  separately
is threefold.
First,  household  surveys,  the main  source of information  on which the preceding
discussion  has been based,  tells us little or nothing  on the matter,  because child abuse is
hardly  likely to  be  reported  to an  interviewer.72 We  suspect  that  some  of the  children
involved  in  objectionable  activities  may  be  hidden  in the  category of those  reported  as
neither working  nor attending  school,  but most of the children  at risk will  simply not be
reported.  Therefore,  the  estimates  and  analyses  of child  labor  that  we  have  cited  or
referred  to  up until  now  refer, essentially,  to non-pathological  activities.  Documentation
of pathological  activities  is  ample  but  inevitably  sketchy  and  impossible  to  analyze
statistically.
Second,  when  talking  of pathological  activities  such  as  prostitution,  begging,  or
soldiering,  it is not possible to weigh the benefits of child "work" (to the parents or to the
children  themselves)  against  the  costs,  as  if we  were  talking  of cattle  minding  or  of
helping  with household  chores.  Where  pathological  activities  are  concerned,  the  costs
cannot be measured against any benefits. No trading-off of nutrition against education,  of
present  against  future  consumption,  can  bring  one  to  conclude  that  extreme  child
exploitation is, all in all, something one can live with.
Third,  many  (again,  no firm  information  is  available) of the  children exposed  to
the worst  forms  of exploitation  have  broken  their  links  with their  families  of origin,73
either  "willingly"  (by  running  away)  or  unwillingly  (by  being  abandoned,  orphaned,
displaced, or sold).  Obviously,  the actions of these children cannot  be explained within a
household decision making framework.
72 But in Chapter 1,  we  have indicated  ways in which a survey can be organized  to find out more about this
matter.
7  "A  percentage  of working youth are runaways  living by their own wits.  While there  is no national  count
due  to the  floating  character  of their  lifestyle,  there  are  an estimated  100,000  homeless  street  children  in
Delhi alone, one out of every five of the city's working children."  (Chatterjee,  1992)
69Nonetheless,  some  of the  mechanisms  that generate  such  pathological  activities
are not fundamentally  different  from those that  explain  child  labor  generally.  It is thus
helpful to have first examined the other,  more acceptable,  forms of child work, for which
statistical analyses are available.  Furthermore,  where  a child is separated  from his or her
farnily of origin not because  of some external  event but  as a result of parental  action,74
what we already know about household decisions will  come  in handy for understanding
how that happened and what can be done to prevent it from happening  in the future.
11.1 Children  for hire
Strictly  speaking,  any  labor  relation  is  a  rental  contract:  the  object  of  the
transaction  is not the  laborer  but the  laborer's  services.  The difference  where  a child  is
concerned  is that the seller is not the laborer  but the laborer's parents.  While,  in the case
of an adult,  it may be presumed  that the deal, however unequal,  leaves the laborer better
off otherwise he or she would not have entered  into it, no such presumption  can be made
in the  case of a child.  Recent reports put the number of child maids in Morocco at around
1 million. Employers pay parents around $14 a month for each child. The American  State
Department  estimates the number of child prostitutes in Casablanca alone to be more than
10,000  (The  Economist, 7-13 October,  2000).  Bales  (1999)  reports  evidence  of teenage
girls rented out for sexual purposes for the price of a few bottles of beer in part's of Brazil
and  Thailand  but also  in  India,  Pakistan,  and  Mauritania.  In other  cases,  children  have
been  observed  doing  extremely  hard  and,  in  some cases,  dangerous  kinds of work  like
mining or making  fireworks.  Similar stories can be heard in other parts of the developing
world.
As we pointed  out  in Chapter 2, in disposing of their children's time,  parents may
take  into account  the  effect that this will  have  on the child's welfare,  but they  will also
take into  account the effect on  their own well  being and  on that of any other household
member.  If parents  attach  little  or  no  weight  to  the  child's  welfare,  the  child  may  be
pushed into morally  or physically  damaging occupations, the benefits of which accrue not
to the child  but to  the rest of the  family.  However,  even parents who have their child's
74  " Few children  run away unless  home  life becomes  untenable.  Abuse  in the  family as a motivating  factor
is corroborated  by social workers  and researchers"  (Chatterjee,  1992).
70best interest at heart may be driven to such excesses if the alternative  is starvation  for all
members of the family.75
What causes such a dismal  state of affairs? The answer is primarily  that,  in some
parts  of  the  world,  the  fact  that  population  growth  is  running  ahead  of  capital
accumulation has driven real wage rates to extremely  low levels.  Where people are cheap,
there is always  somebody willing to pay a little  over the odds,  and somebody willing to
supply,  or have his children  supply,  services that will put his,  or their,  moral or physical
health seriously at risk.
11.2 Children  for sale
Unlike a  labor relation,  slavery makes  one  person the property  of another.  Bales
(1999)  argues  that,  far  from  disappearing,  slavery  has  not  only  persisted  but  actually
increased  in recent decades  in  less developed  parts of the world and that the new slavery
is,  in some ways,  worse than that of the ancient world,  of the American  colonies  before
Wilberforce,  or of the US  South  before  the civil  war.  Being legal  and  openly practiced,
the old slavery was,  in fact,  subject to a minimum of public regulation  and social control.
Modem  slavery,  by contrast,  is clandestine,  and thus free  from any  legal or humanitarian
76 constraint.
Slavery  applies  to adults  as well  as  children,  but  it  may  be  prevalent,  and  it is
certainly  more  odious,  where  children  are  concerned.  There  are  essentially  three
mechanisms through which a child can be enslaved.  One is abduction.
In  some  parts  of the world,  from  Sub-Saharan  Africa  to  ex-Yugoslavia,  where
wars  have produced  a breakdown  of law  and order and  have displaced  large numbers of
people,  and  where  killings and  epidemics  have combined  to produce  scores of orphans,
young children and  adolescents are snatched  from their villages or refugee camps or just
rounded  up  after  becoming  separated  from  their  families.  They  will  re-surface  in
sweatshops  or  begging  at  street  corners  if they  are  lucky,  as  boy  soldiers  or  child
prostitutes  if they  are  less  lucky.  Others  will  die,  drowned  off or  suffocated  in  sealed
containers  during  long  overland transfers,  as their masters  try  to smuggle  them  into the
75  In this respect,  the theoretical  predictions of the "altruistic"  model  do  not differ substantively  from those
of the "egoistic"  model of parental  behavior.  The  more the parents  love a child, the better  the child  fares in
any given set of material circum stances,  but the costs and benefits accruing  to the parents matter anyway.
76  While,  in the old slavery,  a slave  could  at  least expect  to  be fed  and housed  in old age,  a new  slave faces
the prospect of being discarded when no longer useful.
71lucrative markets  of Western  Europe.  Episodes of this kind  are reported  almost daily  in
the media.
The  second  avenue  into  slavery  is debt.  Where  earnings  are  so  low  as to barely
reach subsistence,  there is no way that a family can accumulate  precautionary  reserves  or
save enough  to  pay back  a debt.  Falling  into debt,  maybe  because of some  catastrophic
event  such  as a  serious  illness or a very  bad  crop,  means  that the  family has  to deliver
itself  into  the  hands  of a  creditor.'  In  India  and  Pakistan,  entire  families,  children
included,  work  as  bonded  laborers  in agriculture,  mining,  and industry.  Those  children
will never see the inside of a school in their lives. In Chapter 3, we talked of credit market
imperfections  as a possible cause of under-investment  in education.  Here,  we are looking
at that problem  in its most severe  form.
The third possibility  is that the child is sold by his or her own parents.  Bales talks
of Indian bondsmen selling their daughters to redeem  a debt. However,  parents may resort
to selling their children  even  in the absence of a debt. Why? We  saw,  in Chapter  2, that
parents  face  three orders of uncertainty:  one relating  to how many children  are  actually
born; two relating  to how many of them will  survive to an age where  they can  be either
employed  to  produce  immediate  income  or educated  in the hope that they will  produce
higher  incomes  in  the  future;  and  three,  (an  uncertainty  on  which  we  did  not  dwell)
relating to the economic  environment  faced  by parents.  In the  same way that infanticide,
particularly  of girls,  is  a crude  way of coping with the consequences  of the first type of
uncertainty,  so  selling children,  particularly  girls,  into  slavery  is a crude form  of coping
with  the  consequences  of the  second  and  the third  kinds of uncertainty.  If parents  find
themselves  with too many children,  or with too  many children  of the  wrong  sex,78 they
will sell some.  In extreme cases, they may sell a child not to remedy an error but to buy a
voluptuary  good.79
It  may  be  argued,  from  a  child's  point  of view,  that  there  is  little  practical
difference between  being rented out and being sold (in a sense,  between  being exploited
by one's own parents or by someone else).  However, surely, being removed  from familiar
77 Subsistence  farmers cannot  usually get credit from regular  financial  institutions.  Their creditors are  more
likely  to  be local  landowners  or professional  moneylenders  who have  altemative  means of pressing their
credit.
7  The  two  are  connected.  A  father may  find himself with too  many children  because he  is  looking  for a
son; see  Seidl (1995).
79  Such cases, where  a child  is raised  for pretty  much the same reason  as a  calf, are  documented  in Bales
(1999).
72surrounding  is worse  for the child  in a majority of cases,  also because  the worst  abuses
are likely to be perpetrated  away from the parents'  (and their neighbors')  eyes.
From  the parent's  point of view,  the advantage  of selling,  rather than  renting,  a
child is twofold.  First, if the child is sold outright, the payment comes in a lump sum, and
that is important if the sale is motivated by the need to pay back a debt or by the desire to
buy a durable.  Second,  the payment  is certain,  which is an important consideration  if the
child  is to be taken  a long  way away  from home and  there is thus no guarantee  that the
child,  or the child's employer, would remit the money home  for the many years  to come.
Crudely  put,  selling  the child  secures  the  present  value of a  stream  of uncertain  rental
payments.
11.3 What to do
All  of the  policies  that  would  be  useful  for reducing  child labor  in general  (see
Chapter  10)  are also  helpful  for fighting  the  more extreme  forms of child exploitation.
Policies aimed  at reducing extreme  poverty and at ensuring that making children  work is
no  longer  essential  for  the  family's  survival  and  no  longer  more  advantageous  than
sending them to school will  also help to reduce the number of children  sold or rented out
by  their  own  parents.  Such  policies  might  include  introducing  or  extending  social
security,  improving  the  education,  health,  and  credit  sectors,  redistributing  income,  and
"buying"  children's time.
This does not take care of the problem  of children  abducted  in crisis areas after a
breakdown  of law  and order  or in  countries  with corruptible  police and judiciary.  Here,
the  solution  is to be  found  at the  international  political  level.  As  we  remarked  earlier,
international  agencies  make  loans  and  grants  conditional  on  adopting  appropriate
budgetary  policies  (often  involving  great  hardship  for  the  population  in  the  transition
phase  before  any  benefit  is  felt)  or  on reducing  the  production of coca  leaves  or  poppy
seeds.  It  is difficult to  see  why  it should  not  be possible  to make  international  loans  or
grants  conditional  on  the enactment  and  effective  enforcement  of basic  child  protection
legislation.  By discouraging the  sale of children or of their services  (shifting the  supply
schedule inwards), these policies would raise the equilibrium  price of, and reduce the size
of the market for, child slaves and child labor.
Further results  can  be obtained  by  discouraging  prospective  buyers  (shifting  the
demand  schedule  downwards).  Prospective  buyers  are  essentially of three  kinds.  There
73are enterprises using children  inhumanely for the production of otherwise unobjectionable
commodities  (mineral  ore,  agricultural  produce,  footballs,  carpets,  matchboxes,  and  so
on).  Here,  the  problem  is  not dissimilar  from the  need  to  reduce  child  employment  in
general.  International  labor  standards  that  forbid  the  importation  of goods  made  with
child labor may well help if applied in conjunction with increased  financial  support to the
countries from which the goods originate (see Chapter 9).  Second, there are warlords who
use  children  as  soldiers.  The  problem  in  this  case  goes beyond  child  protection.  The
solution  lies with  international  diplomacy  and  international  peacekeeping  efforts  to  put
military chieftains  out of business.
Finally,  there is the demand for sexual  services.  Demand tends to come from the
richer  members  of  society  within  the  developing  countries  in  question,  but  also
increasingly  from "sexual tourism'  8. In India, domestic  income growth  without notable
reductions  in income disparity and  sexual tourism  elsewhere, have fuelled the demand for
prostitutes  in  general.  The  AIDS  epidemic  has  greatly  increased  the  demand  for  child
prostitutes in particular, as very  young girls are thought less likely to be infected.  Sexual
tourism  keeps  the  market  buoyant  in  certain  countries,  where  prostitution,  even  when
practiced  by children,  is apparently  acceptable  by society  at large  and  thus  is conducted
more  or less  in the  open.  Western  countries are trying to stop sexual tourism  originating
from their shores by enacting  legislation  that allows sexual  offences  against  minors to be
prosecuted  even when those offences  are committed  abroad.  There  are media reports of
increased  police  activism  against  prostitution  in  India.  Trade  sanctions  and  diplomatic
pressure  could be applied to the countries  (both of the origin and the destination  of sexual
tourism) that have not been sufficiently sensitive to the issue.8'
80 (Bales,  1999).
81 As usual, however,  trade sanctions are easier to apply against poor countries, than against rich ones.
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Conclusion
The  arguments  and evidence  that we  have  assembled  in this Handbook make  it
clear  that  child  labor  is  not  a  problem  that  can  be  solved  with  slogans  and  ringing
declarations.  They  also  make  it  clear  that  child  labor  cuts  across  policy  boundaries:
health, education,  labor market, capital market,  social security, criminal law,  international
peace  keeping,  income  growth,  and  distribution  all  have  a  bearing  on  child  labor.
Therefore,  reducing child labor cannot be regarded  as just another policy issue alongside
others;  it  is  a  dimension  of many,  possibly  all,  policies  in  the  field  of development.
Finally, this Handbook makes it clear that child labor,  in all its forms, has common causes
worldwide  but  that  the  efficacy  of the  same  policy  can  differ  substantially  across
countries  and  between  rural  and  urban  areas  of  the  same  country.  Therefore,  any
intervention  should  be based on a detailed  knowledge  of the characteristics  of the target
area.
While  emotionally  appealing  (and  intellectually  defensible  under  certain
assumptions),  a  ban  on  child  labor  and/or  compulsory  school  attendance  may  reduce
rather  improve  welfare.  Above  all,  it  is  very  difficult  to enforce.  As  India's  1983-84
Labour  Ministry report neatly put it,  "[d]espite  the provisions of restrictive  labour  laws,
the practice  of child  labour continues  unabated  because the exploitation  of children  is of
financial  advantage  to employers  and  an  economic  compulsion  to  parents."  Matters  are
not very different  in some other parts of the developing  world.  Worst of all, the effect of
prohibiting the employment of children  is rather like that of prohibiting the sale of liquor
or drugs. Instead of getting rid of the problem,  it pushes  it underground  where it becomes
the province  of the criminal  classes.  In the case  of child labor,  what this means  is that
children  who  are  not allowed  by  law  to  work  in  farmns  or factories  end  up  as barbers,
cobblers,  street  vendors,  waiters  or,  worse, beggars  and prostitutes.  A UNICEF  study on
the plight of the urban child  in India remarked, for example,  that "[t]he number of minors
in the formal  sector has shown a declining trend due to various laws curbing child  labour
...  But the  spread  of urban  poverty  has  pushed  a  large  number  of children  into  the
75informal  workforce.  For  too  many  families,  there  is  no  alternative  to  sending  their
children out to work."  82
International  measures  such  as  banning  the  importation  of goods  produced  by
child labor or sanctions against countries  that do not pass laws against  sexual tourism  or
the exploitation of children can be helpful because they cause the demand  for child labor
to decline. Like trade sanctions,  however, such  measures harm the countries to which they
are  directed  and  particularly  the  poorer  strata  of society,  which  is  where  child  labor
originates.  The  UNICEF  study quoted  above  reports  a Commerce  Ministry  official  in
New  Delhi  as  asserting:  "If children  were  not  employed  by  the  carpet  industry,  India
could  not  effectively  compete  with  Pakistan  or  Iran."  UNICEF's  Morocco  director  is
reported  as  saying that the handicraft  sector  (Morocco's  second  largest employer  and  a
major  tourism  attraction,  Morocco's  main  source  of hard  currency)  would  have  been
crippled  if Morocco  had  applied  a  UNICEF  program  in which  carpets  carry  child-free
certificates.83 Therefore,  "labor standards"  and international  sanctions  may risk making
the  problem  worse  rather  than  better  unless  they  are  accompanied  by  some  form  of
compensation.
Direct  forms  of  intervention,  based  on  the  idea  of "buying"  children's  time,
obviously have an  immediate effect,  and are highly appropriate  in  crisis situations where
children are at risk of ending up as soldiers or prostitutes. In other situations, however,  the
long-term  effect  of such  measures  has  yet  to  be  proven.  The  evidence  suggests  that
indirect forms of intervention, which ensure that  it is no longer in the interest of parents to
send  their  children  to  work,  have  more  certain  and,  above  all,  longer  lasting  effects.
Measures  that reduce  child  labor as  a  by-product  of increased  productivity  and  social
equity are  particularly  desirable  and advisable. Among  the measures  that are  particularly
worthy  of consideration,  we  have  identified  health  policies  that  directly  and  indirectly
reduce  morbidity  and  mortality,  educational  policies  that  reduce  the  marginal  cost  of
school  attendance,  and  social  security  policies that reduce  the demand  for children as  a
form  of investment.  Many  of these  policies  are  conducive  to  economic  growth,  which
itself reduces child  labor.  However,  growth alone is not the solution because  it takes too
long to have  any effect  child  labor. Also,  growth  achieved  by other types of policy  may
make matters a lot worth during the adjustment  period.
82  (Chatterjee,  1992)
33  (The Economist, 7-13 October,  2000).
76Finally, we have stressed the importance  of obtaining data on children  at risk and
have  suggested  ways  of  eliciting  the  required  infornation  through  child-focused
household  surveys within  other data-gathering  exercises.  We have  also pointed out  the
importance  of project supervision  and have  stressed the necessity of designing programs
in such a way that their effectiveness  can be statistically evaluated.
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This survey is an  introduction to child labor issues, a  fast expanding research
and policy area.  It deals with the many aspects of child labor,  including its
causes and effects as well as policies associated with it. The survey takes the
reader from the definition and measurement of "child" and  "labor"  to what we
call the "pathology"  of child  labor, the extreme forms of child exploitation, the
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About  thi  How is  the market for child labor determined?
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